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The  distinctive  feature  of  the  market  for  tax- 
exempt  bonds  is  its  heterogeneity.  The  features  of 
specific  tax-exempt  bonds,  the  characteristics  of  the 
issuers,  the  scope  of the  market  for  the  bonds,  and  the 
conditions  under  which  the  bonds  initially  are  sold 
all  vary  greatly  across  individual  bond  issues.1  As  a 
result,  the  yields  of  different  tax-exempt  bonds  issued 
at  a  given  point  in  time  cover  a  wide  range.  A  sub- 
stantial  amount  of  recent  research  has  attempted  to 
explain  the  effects  of  different  tax-exempt  bond  char- 
acteristics  on  a  bond’s  yield.2 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  describe  in  some 
detail  characteristics  of  tax-exempt  bonds  and  the 
tax-exempt  bond  market  and  to  survey  the  evidence 
on  cause  and  effect  relationships  between  variations 
in  these  characteristics  and  variations  in  the  yields  of 
individual  tax-exempt  bonds.  Table  I  identifies  the 
factors  that  have.  been  analyzed  as  determinants  of 
the  yields  on  individual  tax-exempt  bonds. 
The  first  group  of  characteristics  are  those  related 
to  the  issues  themselves.  These  are  call  provisions, 
coupon  setting  practices,  and  issue  size.  Most  tax- 
exempt  bonds  have  call  provisions  that  permit  the 
issuer  to  redeem  the  bond  prior  to  its  maturity. 
Newly  issued  tax-exempt  bonds  frequently  have 
coupons  that  differ  substantially  from  their  yield-to- 
maturity.  As  a result,  these  bonds  sell  at  prices  above 
or  below  their  par  value.  Finally,  the  size  of  a  tax- 
exempt  issue  can  range  anywhere  from  less  than  $1 
million  to  over  $200  million.3 
1 Sources  of  information  on  tax-exempt  bonds  and  the 
tax-exempt  bond  market  are  Lamb  and  Rappaport  [37], 
Peterson  [43],  Public  Securities  Association  [44], 
Rabinowitz  [45],  and  Robinson  [47]. 
2 There  have  been  at  least  25  regression  studies  of  the 
determinants  of  individual  tax-exempt  bond  yields.  These 
studies  are  enumerated  and  described  briefly  in  the  refer- 
ences  at  the  end  of  this  article.  A  preliminary  version  of 
one  of  these  studies  by  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8]  was  done 
for  the  Federal  Reserve  System’s  Ad  Hoc  Subcommittee 
on Full  Insurance  of  Government  Deposits  [28].  The 
data  collected  for  that  study  is  used  extensively  in  this 
article. 
3  In  this  brief  overview  issue  size  and  revenue  bond 
versus  genera1  obligation  status  are  discussed  in  the  issue 
and  issuer  categories,  respectively.  However,  alternative 
theories  as  to  how  size  and  revenue  bond  status  affect 
yields  relate  them  to  other  categories  as  well.  Conse- 
quently,  later  in  the  article  they  are  discussed  separately 
as  shown  in  Table  I. 
The  second  source  of  diversity  in  the  tax-exempt 
bond  market  relates  to  the  issuers  of the  bonds.  Most 
tax-exempt  bonds  are  classified  either  as  “general 
obligation”  or  as  “revenue”  bonds.  General  obliga- 
tion  bonds  are  issued  by  state  and  local  governments 
and  are  secured  by  the  taxing  power  of  the  issuing 
government.  Revenue  bonds,  in  contrast,  are  usually 
secured  solely  by  the  revenues  of  the  project  they  are 
issued  to  finance.  Typically,  revenue  bonds  are  sold 
by  an  authority,  commission,  special  district,  or  other 
government  entity  created  for  the  specific  purpose. 
A  major  focus  of  studies  of  tax-exempt  yields  has 
been  on  the  risk  of  issuer  default  as  a  determinant  of 
yields.  Default  risk  of  general  obligation  bonds 
depends  on  economic  and  fiscal  conditions  of  the 
government  issuing  the  bonds  while  default  risk  of 
Table  I 
EXPLANATORY  VARIABLES  USED  IN  REGRESSION 
STUDIES  OF  THE  DETERMINANTS  OF  THE  YIELDS 
ON  INDIVIDUAL  MUNICIPAL  BONDS* 
Issue  (Bond)  Characteristics 
1.  call  dummy  variable 
2.  other  call  provision  variables 
3.  coupon  variables 
Issuer  Characteristics 
4.  rating  category  dummy  variables 
5. issue  purpose  dummy  variables 
6.  other  measures  of  default  risk 
Marketing  (Underwriter  Competition) 
7.  number  of  bids 
8.  dispersion  of  bids 
9.  negotiated  dummy  variable 
10.  bank  eligibility  dummy  variable 
Regional  Market  Conditions 
11.  pledging  variables 
12.  other  demand  variables 
13.  supply  variables 
Other 
14.  revenue  bond  versus  general  obligation 
15.  size  of  issue 
16. other 
*  Excluded  are  variables  to  pick  up  national  market  conditions  at 
the  time  of  issue. 
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generated  by  the  project  financed  by  the  bonds. 
The marketing  process  by  which  new  issues  of  tax- 
exempt  bonds  are  sold  is  a  third  broad  area  con- 
sidered  as  a  source  of  variation  in  individual  tax- 
exempt  bond  yields.  Some  small  issues  are  sold 
directly  to  local  banks.  Other  issues  are  generally 
sold  through  the  process  of  underwriting  and  syndi- 
cation,  in  which  a  group  of  dealers  join  together  in  a 
“syndicate”  to  purchase  an  entire  issue  of  bonds 
from  a governmental  unit  for  the  purpose  of  reselling 
them  in  the  retail  market  at  a  slightly  higher  price. 
Commercial  banks  are  prohibited  by  law  from  par- 
ticipating  in  the  underwriting  of  some  types  of  reve- 
nue  bonds. 
future  payments  by  the  issuer  to  the  price  received 
from  the  syndicate.  Conceptually  it  is  a  far  superior 
measure  of  yield  than  NIC.  Both  NIC  and  TIC  are 
calculated  from  the  issuer’s  point  of  view,  so  they 
reflect  not  only  the  payments  to  the  bond  holders, 
but  also  the  payment  to  the  underwriter  (called  the 
“underwriter’s  spread”). 
A  third  yield  concept  is  the  reoffering  yield to 
maturity  earned by  the  investor  who  purchases  a  tax- 
exempt  bond  from  the  underwriter.4  It  is  the  dis- 
count  rate  that  equates  the  present  value  of  the 
stream  of  payments  received  by  the  investor  to  the 
price  he  pays  the  dealer  for  the  bond. 
Bonds  are  purchased  from  the  government  unit  by 
dealers  either  through  negotiation  or  through  com- 
petitive  bidding.  In  the  case  of  negotiation  the  issuer 
chooses  a  syndicate  with  which  it  negotiates  the  pur- 
chase  price  of  the  bonds.  In  the  case  of  competitive 
bidding  the  issuer  solicits  bids  from  syndicates  and 
sells  the  bonds  to  the  highest  bidder.  The  number  of 
bids  received  varies  greatly  across  issues. 
The  fourth  broad  area  that  has  received  some 
attention  as  a  source  of  variation  in  individual  tax- 
exempt  bond  yields is regional  market conditions 
where  the  issue  is  sold.  For  reasons  that  will  be 
explained  in  detail  below,  the  argument  has  been 
made  that  the  demand  for  at  least  some  tax-exempt 
issues  is  largely  regional  in  character.  If  true,  the 
yields  on  these  tax-exempt  bonds  may  be  influenced 
by  regional  supply  and  demand  factors. 
Two  features  of  the  underwriting  process  are 
worth  noting.  First,  prior  to  offering  a  price  to  the 
issuer  for  bonds,  the  underwriting  syndicate  can- 
vasses  potential  buyers  to  get  a  firm  idea  of  the  price 
the  latter  will  offer  for  the  bonds.  Because  of  the 
great  diversity  of  tax-exempt  issues,  this  process  is 
widely  believed  to  help  identify  those  willing  to  pay 
the  highest  price-i.e.,  receive  the  lowest  yield-for 
the  bonds.  Many  studies  have  specified  this  informa- 
tion  as  a  determinant  of  tax-exempt  yields. 
The  second  important  characteristic  of  the  mar- 
keting  process  is  the  method  by  which  the  winning 
bid  is  chosen.  In  most  cases  the  winning  bid  is 
determined  on  the  basis  of  the  syndicate  offering  the 
lowest  net  interest  cost  (NIC)  to  the  issuer.  NIC 
is  defined  as 
The  methodology  employed  by  all  the  studies  of 
individual  tax-exempt  bond  yields  discussed  in  this 
article  is multiple  regression  analysis,  which  regresses 
the  dependent  variable,  a  measure  of  tax-exempt 
yield,  on  various  subsets  of  the  independent  or  ex- 
planatory  variables  listed  in  Table  I.  Some  of  the 
variables  listed  have  been  included  in  virtually  all  of 
the  studies  while  others  have  been  included  in  only  a 
small  number.  The  references  at  the  end  of  this 
article  indicate  the  set  of  explanatory  variables  in 
each  of  the  studies  surveyed,  using  the  same  format 
as  in  Table  I. 
total  interest  payments  +  discount  (or  --  premium) 
bond  year  dollars 
where  bond  year  dollars  is  simply  the  amount  of 
bonds  outstanding  over  the  time  they  are  outstanding. 
A  drawback  of  NIC  is  that  it  ignores  the  time  value 
of money.  Hence,  payments  made  by  the  government 
in  early  years  count  the  same  as  payments  in  later 
years  even  though  the  present  discounted  value  of 
the  later  payments  is  much  lower. 
While  the  basic  approach  followed  by  all  the 
studies  is  similar,  an  important  difference  among 
them  is  the  choice  of  the  yield  to  be  used  as  the 
dependent  variable.  Municipal  bonds  are  generally 
sold  in  serial  issues  that  include  securities  of  several 
maturities.  Most  studies  employ  as  the  dependent 
variable  a  composite  measure  of  the  yields  on  all  of 
the  bonds  in  the  serial  such  as  net  interest  cost 
(NIC)  or  true  interest  cost  (TIC),  both  of  which 
are  measures  of issuer  cost.  The  studies  then  attempt 
to  specify  independent  variables  that  are  representa- 
tive  of  the  entire  serial  issue. 
4 In  the  rest  of  the  article this  is  called  the  reoffering 
yield,  yield-to-maturity  or,  simply,  yield. 
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Although  most  bidding  is  done  on  the  basis  of 
NIC,  some  bonds  are  awarded  on  the  basis  of  the 
lowest  true  interest  cost  (TIC).  TIC  is  the  single 
discount  rate  that  equates  the  present  value  of  all 
This  use  of  a  composite  yield  measure  has  a 
number  of  disadvantages.  First,  treating  the  entire 
serial  as  the  analytical  unit  makes  it  difficult  and  in 
some  cases  impossible  to  analyze  the  effect  on  yields of  particular  bond  (as  opposed  to  issue)  character- 
istics.  For  example,  serial  issues  often  include  short- 
term  bonds  that  are  not  callable  and  some  longer 
term  ones  that  are,  It  is  therefore  very  difficult  to 
measure  differences  in  call  provisions  across  entire 
serial  issues.  Second,  this  approach  precludes  anal- 
ysis  of  the  effect  of  a  particular  factor  on  bond  yields 
of  differing  maturity.  A  third  disadvantage  of  using 
aggregate  yield  measures  such  as  NIC  or  TIC  is 
that  these  variables  include  both  the  compensation  to 
the  underwriter  and  the  return  to  the  investor. 
Hence,  in  some  cases  it  is  difficult  to  interpret 
whether  an  estimated  regression  coefficient  reflects 
the  behavior  of  one  or  both  of  these  groups. 
As  a  result  of  the  disadvantages  of  using  NIC  and 
TIC,  a  small  number  of  studies  have  used  instead 
reoffering  yields  as  the  dependent  variable  in  tax- 
exempt  bond  yield  regressions.  Broaddus  and  Cook 
[8]  estimated  separate  equations  for  four  separate 
maturities:  5 years,  10 years,  15 years,  and  20  years. 
Where  appropriate,  the  independent  variables  were 
defined  differently  for  each  maturity. 
In  addition  to  the  variables  shown  in  Table  I, 
virtually  all  of  the  studies  include  one  or  more  inde- 
pendent  variables  to  capture  the  effect  of  current 
“national  market  conditions”  on  a  bond  yield.  If  the 
dependent  variable  is  the  reoffering  yield  for  a  spe- 
cific  maturity,  then  the  national  market  condition 
variable  chosen  is  always  the  reoffer  yield  on  high- 
grade  general  obligation  bonds  for  that  maturity.  If 
the  dependent  variable  is  NIC  or  TIC,  capturing  na- 
tional  market  conditions  is  much  more  complicated 
because  the  dependent  variable  is  affected  not  only  by 
the  level  of  general  yields  in  the  market  but  also  by 
the  average muturity  of  the  serial  issue  and  the  cur- 
rent  slope  of  the  yield  curve.5  Different  studies  have 
specified  one,  two,  or  three  variables  to  capture  these 
three  effects.6 
A  final  background  comment  on  the  regression 
studies  is  that  conceptually  they  are  cross-section 
studies  that  attempt  to  measure  how  variations  in 
characteristics  across  tax-exempt  issues  influence 
their  yields.  In  practice,  however,  the  studies  use 
5  The  yield  curve  in  the  tax-exempt  market  is  generally 
upward  sloping.  Hence,  for  a  given  level  of  market 
interest  rates  the  NIC  of a serial  issue  will  be  higher  the 
greater  the  average  maturity.  Similarly,  for  a  given 
average  maturity  the  NIC  will  be  higher  the  steeper  the 
slope  of  the  yield  curve.  The  problems  and  possible 
pitfalls  of  using  national  market  conditions  variables  in 
NIC  and  TIC  regressions  are  discussed  in  Broaddus  and 
Cook  [8]. 
6 For  example,  see  Hendershott  and  Kidwell  [15]  who 
include  variables  for  market  yield,  average  maturity  of 
issue,  and  slope  of  the  yield  curve. 
data  gathered  over  periods  from  three  months  or  less 
to  ten  years  or  more.  Lengthy  data  periods  create 
two  potential  problems.  First,  the  effect  of  a  given 
value  of  an  explanatory  variable  may  vary  over  time 
due  to  changes  in  national  economic  conditions. 
Second,  inflation  over  the  data  period  may  cause 
nominal  values  of  variables  to  change,  which  makes 
it  important  to  specify  whether  a  theory  calls  for  an 
explanatory  variable  to  be  measured  in  nominal  or 
real  terms. 
The  remainder  of  this  article  is  divided  into  five 
sections  corresponding  to  the  five  categories  shown 
in  Table  I.  In  each  section  the  relevant  character- 
istics  of  tax-exempt  bonds  are  described.  Next  the 
theories  linking  these  characteristics  to  bond  yields 
are  outlined.  Finally,  the  results  of  the  empirical 
studies  are  presented. 
I. 
ISSUE  CHARACTERISTICS 
Coupons 
Coupon  Setting  Practices  When  state  and  local 
governments  solicit  bids  on  new  issues,  they  set  con- 
straints  on  the  coupons  (i.e.,  annual  interest  pay- 
ment)  that  the  bonds  can  carry  when  they  are  resold 
by  underwriters  to  the  public.  Occasionally,  the 
bonds  are  required  to  carry  coupons  at  each  maturity 
equal  to  their  reoffering  yield  to  maturity.  More 
commonly,  however,  underwriters  are  allowed  a great 
deal  of  flexibility  in  setting  coupons.  As  a  result  of 
this  flexibility,  and  for  reasons  that  will  be  described 
immediately  below,  the  winning  bids  on  tax-exempt 
issues  often  specify  coupons  for  at  least  some  ma- 
turities  that  differ  considerably  from  their  yield  to 
maturity.  Specifically,  new  short-  and  intermediate- 
term  bonds  often  carry  a  coupon  above  their  yield  to 
maturity  while  long-term  issues  often,  but  less  fre- 
quently,  carry  a coupon  below  their  yield  to  maturity. 
When  a bond  has  a coupon  above  its  yield  to  maturity 
it  is  sold  at  a  “premium,”  i.e.,  at  a  price  above  its 
par  value.  Conversely,  when  a  bond  has  a  coupon 
below  its  yield  it  is  sold  at  a  “discount.” 
Table  II  shows  the  different  coupon-setting  prac- 
tices  on  the  winning  bids  for  ten  tax-exempt  issues. 
As  the  table  illustrates,  sometimes  the  coupon  is  set 
well  above  the  yield  to  maturity  at  the  5-year  ma- 
turity,  about  equal  to  the  yield  to  maturity  at  the 
15-year  maturity,  and  well  below  the  yield  to  ma- 
turity  at  the  20-year  maturity.  This  pattern  is  shown 
in  issues  3  and  6  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  issues  4 
and  10.  In  other  cases  such  as  issues  1  and  9  the 
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1.  Plano,  Texas 
(3-14-77) 
2.  Columbia, Missouri 
(3-30-77) 
3.  Anderson  Co., 
Tennessee 
(3-31-77) 
4.  State  of  Hawaii 
(4-5-77) 
5.  Nebraska  Public 
Power  District 
(4-5-77) 
6.  Miami,  Florida 
(4-14-77) 
7.  Carroll  co., 
Maryland 
(4-20-77) 
8.  New  Jersey 
Housing Finance 
(4-28-77) 
9.  Alaska  Municipal 
Bond Bank 
(4-27-77) 
IO.  Mecklenberg  Co., 
North  Carolina 
(5-3-77) 
Table  II 
COUPONS  AND  YIELDS  TO  MATURITY  OF  SELECTED  TAX-EXEMPT  ISSUES 
coupon  is  set  well  above  the  yield  to  maturity  at  the 
early  maturities  but  does  not  fall  below  the  reoffering 
yield  at  the  longer  maturities.  A  third  group  of 
issues,  such  as  issues  5 and  8,  have  coupons  equal  to 
yields  throughout  the  entire  range  of  maturities. 
Coupons  are  never  set  below  yield  to  maturity  at  the 
shorter  maturities  or  above  it at  the  20-year  maturity. 
Table  III  shows  the  spread  between  coupon  and 
yield  to  maturity  at  the  shorter  maturities  for  all  the 
issues  included  in  the  Broaddus-Cook  study  [8].7 
At  the  5-year  maturity,  745  out  of  885  issues  had 
coupons  above  their  yield.  Of  these,  the  difference 
between  coupon  and  yield  was  greater  than  one  per- 
centage  point  for  392  bonds  and  greater  than  two 
percentage  points  for  146  bonds.  The  number  of 
bonds  with  large  premiums  dropped  sharply  at  the 
10-year  maturity  and  was  negligible  at  the  15-year 
maturity. 
7 Data  from  the  study  by  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8]  is  used 
for  description  throughout  this  section.  Bonds  used  in 
the  study  were  almost  all  those  for  which  reoffering 
yields  were  reported  in  Moody’s  Bond  Survey  from 
March  1977  through  the  end  of  1978. 
Table  IV  shows  the  distribution  of  issues  with 
coupons  below  yield  to  maturity  at  the  15-  and  20- 
year  maturities.  At  the  20-year  maturity,  318  of  the 
issues  in  the  sample  had  coupons  below  their  yield. 
Of  these,  however,  only  33  had  coupons  more  than 
one  percentage  point  below  yield.  At  the  15-year 
maturity,  181  were  sold  at  a discount;  but  in  all  cases 
the  difference  between  yield  and  coupon  was  quite 
small. 
Explanation  for  and  Possible  Costs  of  Coupon- 
Setting  Practices  The  coupon  setting  practices  illus- 
trated  above  occur  because,  as  noted  earlier,  winning 
bids  on  most  serial  municipal  bonds  are  determined 
on  the  basis  of net  interest  cost  (NIC).  NIC  bidding 
creates  incentive  for  underwriters  to  set  high  coupons 
at  the  shorter  maturities  and  low  coupons  at  the 
longer  maturities:8 
Because  investors  place  time  value  on  coupons, 
coupons  on  early  maturities  can  be  sold  by  the 
8 This  explanation  is  given  in  more  detail  in  Robinson 
[47]  and  Hopewell  and  Kaufman  [32,  33].  Robinson 
(Appendix  B)  and  Public  Securities  Association  [44, 
Appendix]  give  examples. 
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PREMIUM  BONDS 
Distribution  of  Bonds  by  Spread  Between 
Coupon  and  Yield  to  Maturity 
(number  of  bonds) 
Spread:  5-year  10-year  15-year 
(percentage  points)  maturity  maturity  maturity 
Equal  to  0  (or  negative)  140  306  622 
123  332  207 
230  129  11 
142  50  9 
104  51  2 
95  26  0 
36  3  0 
6  2  0 
6  2  0 
2  0  0 
1  0  0 
Total  885  901  851 
Source:  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8]. 
underwriters  at  higher  prices  than  coupons  on 
later  maturities  summing  to  the  same  dollar 
amount.  Yet,  under  NIC,  these  coupons  do  not  cost 
the  underwriter  any  extra.  Thus,  to  maximize 
their  revenues  from  the  sale  of  the  bonds,  the 
underwriters  are  encouraged  to  place  the  highest 
coupons  on  the  earliest  maturities.  The  placing  of 
large  coupons  on  the  early  maturities  is  referred  to 
as  frontloading.  To  obtain  a  low  NIC,  compen- 
sating  low  coupons  are  placed  on  the  most  distant 
maturities  [32,  p.  534]. 
There  are  two  possible  limitations  to  the  ability  of 
underwriters  to  set  coupons  that  differ  from  a  bond’s 
yield  to  maturity.  The  first  is  that  investors  may 
purchase  bonds  with  such  coupons  only  if  compen- 
sated  by  a  higher  yield  than  on  an  otherwise  similar 
par  bond.  At  some  point  this  could  offset  the  advan- 
tage  to  an  underwriter  in  achieving  a  low  NIC  of 
setting  high  coupons  at  shorter  maturities  and  low 
coupons  at  longer  maturities.  The  second  limitation 
may  be  imposed  by  issuers  who  specify  constraints 
on  the  type  of  coupon  they  will  accept. 
Hopewell  and  Kaufman  [32,  33]  identified  two 
possible  costs  to  municipal  governments  of  awarding 
bonds  sold  competitively  to  underwriters  on  the  basis 
of  NIC  bidding  as  opposed  to  true  interest  cost 
(TIC)  bidding.  The  first  cost  is  that  the  lowest 
NIC  bid  may  not  be  the  same  as  the  lowest  TIC  bid. 
In  other  words  the  government  may  accept  the  wrong 
bid.  The  second  potential  cost  of  using  NIC  bidding 
is  that,  for  reasons  to  be  discussed  below,  investors 
may  only  purchase  bonds  with  coupons  that  are  above 
or  below  their  yield  to  maturity  at  a  lower  price  than 
bonds  that  have  coupons  equal  to  their  yields  and 
that  are  otherwise  equal  in  all  respects.  If  this  were 
the  case  then  all  bids  (in  terms  of  the  prices  offered 
by  underwriters)  under  NIC  bidding  would  be  lower 
than  under  TIC  bidding  because  under  NIC  bidding 
the  bonds  would  be  worth  less  to  the  ultimate  in- 
vestors.9 
The  question  remains  as  to  why  investors  might 
demand  a  higher  yield  to  maturity  for  bonds  that 
carry  “high”  or  “low”  coupons.  For  bonds  with  low 
coupons  there  is  a  powerful  reason  for  this  relating 
to  the  taxation  on  income  earned  on  discount  bonds 
versus  income  earned  on  bonds  selling  at  par.  Par 
bonds  are  not  subject  to  any  Federal  taxes  because 
all  the  income  is  tax-exempt  interest  income.  How- 
ever,  investors  in  low  coupon  discount  bonds  gener- 
ally  have  to  pay  capital  gains  taxes  at  maturity  on  the 
difference  between  the  par  value  and  purchase  price 
of  the  bond.10  Consequently,  a  higher  yield  is  re- 
quired  on  a  discount  bond  in  order  to  earn  the  same 
after-tax  yield  as  a  par  bond. 
9 Hence,  the  lowest  TIC  bid  under  NIC  bidding  may  be 
higher  than  the  lowest  TIC  bid  that  would  occur  under 
TIC  bidding.  This  is  distinct  from  the  first  possible 
cost  of  NIC  bidding,  which  is  that  the  issuer  may  not 
select  the  lowest  TIC  bid. 
10 The  question  of  whether  the  discount  on  new  tax- 
exempt  issues  is  subject  to  capital  gains  tax  is  very  con- 
fusing.  According  to  a  1973 publication  of  the  Securities 
Industry  Association  [26,  p.  9]: 
Issue  discount  is  recognized  as  being  interest  in 
substance  and  as  “interest”  on  a  tax  exempt  bond 
such  issue  discount  is  tax  exempt.  .  .  .  This  is  true 
only  where  the  bond  is  issued  at  a  discount  and  does 
not  apply  where  bonds  which  were  originally  sold  at 
par  or  at  a  premium  are  subsequently  re-offered  at  a 
discount.  Where  an  issue  of  serial  bonds  is  purchased 
from  the  issuer  by  a  dealer  at  a  single  unallocated 
price  of  not  less  than  their  total  par  value  (face 
amount)  and  some  of  them  are  re-offered  by  the 
dealer  at  a discount,  they  are  not  issued  at  a  discount. 
This  statement  clearly  implies  that  if  an  underwriter  pur- 
chases  an  entire  serial  issue  of  bonds  at  a  single  price  not 
less  than  their  total  par  value  and  some  of  the  bonds  are 
reoffered  by  the  dealer  at  a  discount,  the  capital  gain  is 
not  tax-exempt.  However.,  a just-published  article  ("The 
Tax  Treatment  of  Municipal  Discount  Bonds: Cor- 
rection  of  a  Fallacy”  by  Ronald  C.  Braswell,  Walter  J. 
Reinhart,  and  James  R.  Hasselback,  Financial  Manage- 
ment,  Spring  1982)  states  unequivocally,  citing  IRS 
Revenue  Ruling  73-112,  that  if  an  investor  buys  a  new 
discount  bond  from  an  underwriter,  the  discount  is 
treated  as  tax-free  interest  income  regardless  of  the  cir- 
cumstances  under  which  the  underwriter  acquired  the 
bond  from  the  issuer.  In  any  case  the  regression  results 
discussed  in  this  section  present  convincing  evidence  that 
at  least  in  the  1977-78  period  investors  viewed  new  issue 
discount  bonds  as  subject  to  capital  gains  tax. 
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DISCOUNT  BONDS 
Distribution  of  Bonds  by  Spread  Between 
Yield  to  Maturity  and  Coupon 
(number  of  bonds) 
Spread:  15-year  20-year 
(percentage  points)  maturity  maturity 
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Hopewell  and  Kaufman  argued  that  even  after 
adjusting  for  tax  differences  investors  may  require  a 
higher  yield  on  discount  bonds  than  on  par  bonds  for 
two  additional  reasons  [33,  pp.  284-285].  First,  since 
low  coupon  bonds  have  longer  duration  than  par 
bonds  of  comparable  maturity  investors  might,  to  the 
extent  that  liquidity  premiums  increase  with  dura- 
tion,  demand  a  higher  yield  on  low  coupon  bonds.11 
Second,  discount  bonds  may  be  less  marketable  than 
par  bonds  and  consequently  investors  might  demand  a 
higher  yield.  The  major  argument  Hopewell  and 
Kaufman  presented  for  the  effect  of  high  coupons  on 
yields  is  that  high  coupon  bonds  may  subject  inves- 
tors  to  greater  reinvestment  risk  [32,  p.  535]. 
Empirically,  Hopewell  and  Kaufman  concluded 
that  both  high  and  low  coupons  raise  yields,  although 
the  effect  of  high  coupons  was  much  smaller.12  They 
also  concluded  that  in  most  cases,  capital  gains  tax 
liability  by  itself  is  insufficient  to  explain  the  magni- 
tude  of  the  additional  yield  required  on  discount 
bonds. 
Regression  Results  Of  the  regression  studies  on 
the  determinants  of  tax-exempt  yield  only  the 
Broaddus-Cook  study  attempted  to  estimate  the  effect 
of  high  and  low  coupons  on  yields  to  maturity.  The 
study  calculated  a  data  series  for  high  coupon  bonds 
11  Duration  is  a  weighted  average  of  times  in  the  future 
when  payments  are  to  be  received. 
12  Hopewell  and  Kaufman  did  not  use  the  regression 
technique  common  to  the  studies  surveyed  in  this  article. 
Hence,  their  results  are  not  discussed  in  detail  here.  See 
[33]. 
by  taking  the  difference  between  coupon  and  yield 
and  a  similar  series  for  low  coupon  bonds  by  taking 
the  difference  between  yield  and  coupon.  (In  both 
cases  the  values  were  set  equal  to  zero  if  they  were 
negative.)  These  series  were  then  entered  as  explana- 
tory  variables  in  the  four  maturity  regressions.  The 
regression  results  strongly  supported  the  view  that 
low  coupons  raise  yields  to  maturity.  At  the  20-year 
and  15-year  maturities  the  estimated  effects  were  19 
and  36  basis  points,  respectively,  for  each  percentage 
point  difference  between  yield  and  coupon.  These 
estimates  support  Hopewell  and  Kaufman’s  conten- 
tion  that  the  effect  of  low  coupons  on  tax-exempt 
bond  yields  was  greater  than  could  be  explained  by 
the  capital  gains  tax  factor  alone.13 
A  possible  explanation  for  the  larger  estimated 
effect  on  yields  of  selling  discount  bonds  at  the  15- 
year  maturity  than  at  the  20-year  is  that  it  reflects 
the  greater  role  of  commercial  bank  behavior  at  the 
15-year  maturity.  According  to  Hobby  [31],  bank 
holdings  of  tax-exempt  bonds  fall  off  sharply  after 
10-  to  15-year  maturity  range.  Since  commercial 
banks  have  a  higher  capital  gains  tax  rate  than  indi- 
viduals,  who  are  the  second  largest  group  of  investors 
in  tax-exempt  securities,  one  might  expect  the  mar- 
ginal  investor  at  the  15-year  maturity  to  have  a 
higher  capital  gains  tax  rate  than  the  marginal  in- 
vestor  at  the  20-year  maturity.  This  would  push  up 
the  coefficient  of  the  low  coupon  variable  in  the  15- 
year  regression  relative  to  the  coefficient  in  the  20- 
year  regression. 
The  evidence  from  the  regressions  for  an  effect  of 
high coupons  on  yields  to  maturity  was  very  weak. 
The  coefficient  in  the  regression  for  the  5-year  ma- 
turity  was  less  than  2 basis  points  and  was  significant 
only  at  the  10  percent  level.  The  coefficients  of  the 
high  coupon  variables  in  the  10-  and  15-year  maturity 
regressions  were  not  significant. 
These  results  indicate  that  discount  bonds  consti- 
tute  by  far  the  greatest  cost  to  governments  in  terms 
of  the  additional  yield  required  to  induce  investors  to 
buy  them.  The  small  number  of  large  discounts  in 
the  1977-78  period  indicate  that  most  governments 
have  realized  this  and  have  put  constraints  on  the  use 
of  low  coupons  in  NIC  bidding. 
13  In  order  to  make  this  judgment  the  estimated  coeffi- 
cients  of  the  low  coupon  variables  were  compared  to 
hypothetical  coefficients  calculated  under  the  assumption 
that  only  the  capital  gains  effect  was  at  work.  The  calcu- 
lation  used  the  48  percent  capital  gains  tax  rate  of  the 
commercial  banking  sector,  which  is  the  largest  investor 
in  the  tax-exempt  market  and  which  has  the  highest 
capital  gains  rate.  Hence,  the  hypothetical  coefficients 
were  the  maximum  expected  if  capital  gains  taxes  were 
the  only  force  pushing  up  the  yield  on  discount  bonds. 
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The  Extent  and  Nature  of  Call  Provisions  on  Tax- 
Exempt  Bonds  Most  tax-exempt  bonds  have  call 
provisions  that  permit  the  issuer  to  redeem  them 
prior  to  maturity  under  certain  conditions.  For  ex- 
ample,  in  the  Broaddus-Cook  data  sample  58.5  per- 
cent  of  the  general  obligation  issues  and  all  of  the 
revenue  bond  issues  were  callable. 
Call  provisions  vary  substantially  across  tax- 
exempt  issues.  To  illustrate,  the  provisions  of  ten 
issues  are  shown  in  Table  V.  The  call  provisions 
typically  include  the  date  of  first  call,  the  price  the 
issuer  must  pay  per  $100  at  the  time  of  first  call,  and 
the  changes  in  call  price  between  first  call  and  ma- 
turity.  It  is  also  generally  indicated  whether  the 
bonds  in  a  serial  issue  are  callable  “inversely,”  i.e., 
in  reverse  order  of  maturity. 
On  the  right-hand  side  of  Table  V  specific  char- 
acteristics  of  the  call  provisions  are  extracted  from 
the  summary  statements  of  the  issuer.  The  number 
of  years  to  first  call  is  specified  for  the  whole  pack- 
age,  rather  than  for  individual  maturities,  so  that  it  is 
the  same  for  all  maturities.  The  table  illustrates  that 
while  the  most  common  number  of  years  to  first  call 
is  ten,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  variation. 
The  summary  data  on  years  to  first  call  for  the 
issues  used  in  the  Broaddus-Cook  regressions  is 
shown  in  Table  VI.  These  data  show  that  although  a 
particular  serial  issue  may  be  “callable,”  some  of  the 
bonds  that  comprise  the  issue  may  in  fact  mature 
before  the  first  call  date.  Only  0.7  percent  of  the 
callable  issues  at  the  5-year  maturity  had  an  initial 
call  date  prior  to  maturity.  This  figure  rises  to  10.6 
percent  for  the  lo-year  maturity,  88.1  percent  for 
the  15-year  maturity,  and  98.2  percent  for  the  20-year 
maturity. 
The  examples-shown  in  Table  V  also  illustrate  the 
variation  in  call  price  provisions  across  different  bond 
issues.  These  provisions  typically  indicate  the  call 
price  at  the  time  of  first  call  and  specify  how  it  de- 
clines  to  par  in  between  the  time  of  first  call  and 
maturity.  The  provisions  are  specified  for  the  issue 
as  a  whole  but  the  call  price  at  a  given  point  may  or 
may  not  be  the  same  for  bonds  of  different  maturity 
with  a  given  issue.  Call  price  schedules  generally 
fall  into  two  categories.  Some  issues  specify  a  specific 
price  covering  all  maturities  for  each  point  in  time. 
For  instance,  the  call  price  of  issue  8  is  $104  per 
$100  at  the  time  of  first  call  and  then  drops  sharply 
to  $100  four  years  later.  Other  issues  specify  a 
formula.  For  instance  issue  2  specifies  the  call  price 
for  any  maturity  as  100  plus ¼  percent  for  each  12 
months  or  fraction  thereof  between  date  of  redemp- 
tion  and  date  of  maturity.  In  this  instance  the  price 
at  time  of  first  call  would  be  $101.25  for  the  15-year 
maturity  and  $102.50  for  the  20-year  maturity.  Some 
issues  that  specify  formulas  indicate  an  upper  limit 
for  the  call  price.  For  instance,  the  cap  for  any 
maturity  in  issue  2  is  $102.50.  Issue  1 has  the  same 
formula  as  issue  2,  but  without  a cap.  The  examples 
shown  in  Table  V  also  illustrate  that  in  some  in- 
stances  the  call  price  drops  quite  slowly  while  in 
others  it  drops  sharply  to  100. 
Table  VII  shows  the  call  price  at  the  first  call  date 
for  the  bonds  in  the  15-year  maturity  Broaddus-Cook 
regression.  The  table,  which  includes  only  those 
issues  in  the  regression  that  are  callable  prior  to 
maturity,  shows  that  while  a  price  of  $103  at  the 
time  of  first  call  is  most  common,  call  prices  fall 
over  a  wide  range  including  $100. 
The  Predicted  Effects  of  Call  Provisions  on  Tax- 
Exempt  Bond  Yields  Callable  tax-exempt  bonds 
may  have  higher  yields  to  maturity  than  otherwise 
similar  non-callable  bonds  because  they  expose  the 
investor  to  the  risk  of having  to  invest  his  money  at  a 
lower  interest  rate  between  the  time  of  call  and 
maturity.  In  compensation  for  this  risk,  investors 
may  demand  a  higher  “promised”  yield  to  maturity 
on  callable  than  on  non-callable  bonds. 
The  effect  of call  risk  on  the  yield  of a bond  should 
depend  on  two  broad  factors.  The  first  is  the  ex- 
pected  pattern  of  interest  rate  movement  over  the  life 
of  the  bond.  Ceteris  paribus,  the  lower  interest  rates 
are  expected  to  fall  relative  to  current  rates  between 
the  first  call  date  and  maturity,  the  greater  the  proba- 
bility  that  the  issuer  will  find  it  profitable  to  call  the 
issue.14  The  second  factor  consists  of  the  call  pro- 
visions  specific  to  that  bond.  The  longer  the  years  to 
first  call  for  a  bond  of a  given  maturity  the  lower  the 
exposure  to  call  risk.  Consequently,  one  would  ex- 
pect  the  effect  of  call  risk  to  vary  inversely  with  the 
number  of  years  to  first  call.  Also,  the  higher  the 
call  price  the  lower  the  probability  that  the  market 
price  of  the  bond  will  rise  enough  for  the  issuer  to 
find  the  call  option  attractive.  Consequently,  one 
would  expect  increases  in  the  call  price  to  decrease 
the  risk  of  call  and  thereby  decrease  the  impact  of 
callability  on  a  bond’s  yield. 
14 The  risk  of  interest  rates  falling  to  a  level  where  the 
tax-exempt  bond  will  be  called  may  be  viewed  as  a  func- 
tion  of  the  expected  change  in  interest  rates  and/or  as  a 
function  of  the  expected  variation  in  rates.  The  only 
regression  study  [8]  that  attempted  to  capture  this  effect 
used  a  proxy  for  the  expected  change  in  rates. 
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CALL PROVISIONS OF SELECTED TAX-EXEMPT ISSUES
Bond issue Call provisions specified by issuer








5. Kentucky Hous. Corp.
(8-18-77)
6. Hennepin Co., Minnesota
(9-13-77)
7. Mera, Arizona Utility
(10-3-77)
8. Anchorage Alaska Electric
(11-8-77)
Callable as a whole or in port inversely
and by lot within a maturity from any
available funds on any interest date
beginning April 15, 1984 at 100 plus
¼ percent for each year or fraction
thereof between date of redemption
and date of maturity.
Callable as a whole on any date, or in
part inversely and by lot within a
maturity on any interest date, beginning
Sept. 15, 1987 at 100 plus ¼ percent
for each 12 months or fraction thereof
between date of redemption and date
of maturity, premium not to exceed
2½ percent.
Callable beginning June 1, 1992 or any
interest date thereafter at 100.
Callable as a whole, or in part inversely
on any interest date beginning Aug. 1,
1987 thru Feb. 1: 1989, 103½; 1991,
103; 1993, 102½; 1995, 102; 1997,
101½; 1999, 101; thereafter 100.
Callable as a whole or in part at any
time beginning July 1, 1987 thru
June 30: 1988, 103; 1989, 102; 1990,
101; thereafter 100.
Callable as a whole or in part inversely
on any interest date beginning Jan. 1,
1987 at 100.
Callable as a whole or in part inversely
on any interest date beginning July 1,
1983 at 100 plus ½ percent for each
year between date of redemption and
date of maturity, premium not to exceed
3 percent.
Callable as a whole or in part inversely
and by lot within a maturity on any
interest date beginning May 1, 1988 to
Nov. 1: 1989, 104; 1990, 103; 1991,
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Source: Moody’s Municipal and Government (News Reports), 1977; Moody’s Bond Survey, 1977,Table  VI 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  BONDS  BY  YEARS  TO  FIRST  CALL 
(number  of  bonds) 
5-year  10-year  15-year  20-year 
regression  regression  regression  regression 
*  Bonds below  the  solid  line  ore  not  callable  because  call  date  is not  prior  to  maturity. 
Source:  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8]. 
Before  reporting  the  regression  results  on  the 
effect  of  call  provisions  on  tax-exempt  bond  yields, 
several  complications  should  be  mentioned.  First,  as 
discussed  above,  a  given  tax-exempt  issue  is  a  con- 
glomeration  of bonds  among  which  call  risk  may  vary 
greatly.  Hence,  like  the  analysis  of  coupon  effects, 
the  analysis  of  call  provisions  must  focus  on  individ- 
ual  bonds,  not  serial  issues.  Second,  while  the  pro- 
tection  offered  by  years  to  first  call  is  fully  captured 
by  one  number,  the  call  price  at  a  given  point,  such 
as  the  first  call  date,  is  only  a  rough  proxy  for  the 
price  over  the  whole  period  between  years  to  first 
Table  VII 
CALL  PRICE  AT  TIME  OF  FIRST  CALL  FOR 
BONDS  IN  15-YEAR  REGRESSION* 
Call  price 
Equals  100 
greater  than  104 
Total 









*  Includes  only  bonds  callable  in  less  than 
15  yews. 
Source:  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8]. 
call  and  maturity.  Third,  in  general,  the  difference 
between  the  call  price  and  the  price  of the  bond  repre- 
sents  the  gap  that  has  to  be  overcome  by  falling 
interest  rates  before  the  market  price  of  the  bond 
rises  to  its  call  price.  The  larger  the  gap,  the  greater 
the  decline  in  interest  rates  necessary  to  make  call 
profitable  to  the  issuer  and,  hence,  the  lower  the  risk 
of  call.  The  size  of  this  gap,  however,  depends  not 
only  on  the  call  price  but  also  on  the  initial  price  of 
the  bond,  which  is  frequently  not  par.  Consider  the 
case  of a discount  bond  selling  at  $95  with  a call  price 
of $103.  In  this  case  interest  rates  have  to  fall  enough 
to  raise  the  market  price  of  the  bond  from  $95  to 
$103.  The  point  here  is  that  coupon  effects  complicate 
the  analysis  of  call  risk. 
A  final  complication  in  analyzing  the  effect  of  call 
provisions  on  tax-exempt  yields  is  that  they  are 
interdependent.  That  is,  call  risk  for  a  particular 
issue  depends  jointly  on  interest  rate  expectations, 
years  to  first  call,  call  price,  and  initial  price  of  the 
bond.  Consider  the  case  where  interest  rates  are  at  a 
cyclical  low  and  are  expected  to  rise  in  the  future. 
Then  investors  may  have  little  fear  that  callable 
bonds  will  be  called.  In  such  a  period  variations  in 
call  price  or  years  to  first  call  across  bonds  of  a  given 
maturity  may  have  little  effect  on  yields. 
Regression  Results  The  approach  used  in  all  but 
one  of  the  eighteen  regression  studies  that  attempted 
to  capture  the  effect  of  call  provisions  on  tax-exempt 
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set  equal  to  one  for  callable  issues  or  a  variable  for 
the  number  of years  to  first  call.15  The  predicted  sign 
of  the  call  dummy  variable  coefficient  is  positive 
while  the  predicted  sign  of  the  years  to  first  call 
coefficient  is  negative.  These  studies  have  generally 
had  poor  results  in  estimating  the  effect  of  call  pro- 
visions.  Only  in  four  studies  [15,  19,  20,  22]  did  all 
reported  regressions  have  statistically  significant  call 
variable  coefficients  with  the  predicted  sign.16  Of 
those  studies  reporting  significant  coefficients  for  the 
call  dummy  variable,  the  coefficients  with  one  excep- 
tion  ranged  from  11  to  35  basis  points.17 
The  unexpectedly  poor  results  of these  studies  stem 
from  the  complications  discussed  above.  First,  the 
dummy  variable  technique  forces  the  effect  of  call 
risk  to  be  constant  over  the  whole  period  covered  by  a 
study’s  data  sample.  It  is  clear,  however,  from  the 
reasoning  above  and  from  evidence  in  the  corporate 
bond  market  (see  Yawitz  and  Marshall  [51]  for 
example)  that  this  should  not  be  the  case.  Second, 
12 of  the  17  studies  used  the  whole  issue  as  the  unit 
of  investigation  and  NIC or  TIC  as  the  dependent 
variable.  As  noted  above,  this  approach  cannot  ac- 
curately  estimate  call  effects,  because  a  given  callable 
serial  issue  in  fact  is  a  conglomeration  of  bonds,  only 
some  of  which  are  callable.  And  even  among  callable 
bonds  within  a  given  serial  issue  the  effect  on  yield 
of  a  given  set  of  call  provisions  may  vary. 
The  Broaddus-Cook  study  attempted  to  deal  with 
these  problems  by  analyzing  the  effects  of  call  risk 
on  yields  to  maturity  at  three  different  maturities: 
10,  15, and  20  years.  In  each  case  rather  than  use  a 
simple  call  dummy  the  study  used  an  interest  rate 
expectations  proxy  that  allowed  the  effect  of  call  risk 
to  vary  over  time  as  expectations  varied.  This  proxy 
was  the  spread  between  the  20-  and  7-year  U.S. 
government  bond  yields.18  The  assumption  under- 
15 An  exception  within  this  group  is  Kidwell  [18]  who 
tested  for  other  call  features.  However,  years  to  first  call 
is  the  only  call  feature  that  had  a  significant  coefficient 
with  the  predicted  sign  in  any  of  his  regressions. 
16 In  seven  studies  [4,  11,  12,  17,  18,  23,  24]  the  results 
were  mixed  and  in  six  studies  [3,  6,  7,  14,  16,  21]  there 
were  no  statistically  significant  call  variable  coefficients. 
17 Specifically,  references  [4,  15,  19,  20]  reported  coeffi- 
cients  of  .346,  .148,  .110,  and  .137,  respectively.  Reference 
[24]  reported  a  coefficient  of  .198  for  general  obligation 
issues  and  a  coefficient  of  .995  for  all  issues. 
18 An  implicit  assumption  is  that  the  adjustment  to 
changing  interest  rate  expectations  is  made  solely  through 
the  yield  on  callable  bonds.  This  in  turn  assumes  that 
state  and  local  governments  do  not  alter  years  to  first 
call  and  call  prices  to  offset  the  effect  of  changing 
interest  rate  expectations  on  callable  bond  yields.  Both 
Kidwell  [36]  and  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8]  present  evi- 
dence  that  supports  this  assumption. 
lying  the  use  of  this  proxy  is  that  in  1977  and  1978 
changes  in  the  U.  S.  bond  yield  curve  were  deter- 
mined  by  changes  in  interest  rate  expectations.19 
This  proxy  was  set  equal  to  zero  if  years  to  first  call 
of  a  particular  issue  were  greater  than  the  maturity 
of  the  bond  in  question. 
The  study  made  the  effect  of  years  to  first  call  and 
call  price  on  a  bond’s  yield  dependent  on  the  interest 
rate  expectations  proxy.  The  specific  call  price 
variable  used  was  the  difference  between  the  call 
price  of  a  bond  at  the  time  of  first  call  and  its  price 
at  the  time  of  first  call  calculated  using  the  initial 
reoffering  yield  of  the  bond.  (The  gap  between  these 
two  prices  is  a  proxy  for  the  amount  rates  have  to 
fall  below  the  initial  yield  before  the  bond’s  market 
price  at  first  call  rises  to  its  call  price.) 
The  study  found  a  highly  significant  relationship 
between  interest  rate  expectations  and  the  yield  on 
callable  tax-exempt  bonds  at  the  15-  and  20-year 
maturity.  The  coefficient  of  the  10-year  maturity 
was  only  significant  at  the  10  percent  level.  The 
study  also  found  a  significant  negative  relationship 
between  years  to  first  call  and  the  effect  of  call  risk 
on  yield.  The  coefficient  of  the  call  price  variable 
did  not  have  the  expected  sign  in  any  regressions  and 
it  was  concluded  that  the  call  price  at  the  first  call 
date  is  simply  a  poor  proxy  for  the  call  price  over 
the  whole  span  between  years  to  first  call  and  ma- 
turity.  The  estimated  call  effect  for  a  20-year  bond 
with  5  years  to  first  call  ranged  from  8  to  22  basis 
points  over  the  1977-78  period.  For  a  bond  with  10 
years  call  protection,  the  effect  was  only  3  to  9  basis 
points.  These  effects  are  fairly  small  compared  to 
those  reported  in  corporate  bond  studies.  However, 
the  1977-78  period  was  one  of  low  tax-exempt  rates 
relative  to  the  previous  three  years  and  one  might 
consequently  expect  call  risk  to  be  relatively  small  in 
this  period. 
II. 
ISSUER  CHARACTERISTICS:  DEFAULT  RISK 
The  Expected  Effect  of  Default  Risk  on 
Tax-Exempt  Bond  Yields 
Yields  on  tax-exempt  bonds  are  calculated  using 
the  promised  interest  payments  of the  bonds.  Default 
risk  refers  to  the  possibility  that  an  issuer  of  a  bond 
may  not  make  these  payments  or  may  not  make  them 
19 The  specific  variable  used  was  (call  dummy)  (1/eSPR) 
where  the  call  dummy  indicates  whether  or  not  the  issue 
is  callable  and  SPR  is  the  spread  between  20-  and  7-year 
U.  S.  government  bond  yields.  This  functional  form  has 
the  feature  that  as  the  spread  gets  very  high  the  effect 
of  call  risk  approaches  zero. 
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on  a  bond  in  two  ways.  First,  a  higher  promised 
yield  to  maturity  is  necessary  to  achieve  a  given 
expected  yield.  Second,  the  investor  may  demand  a 
higher  expected  yield  on  a  risky  bond,  relative  to  the 
yield  on  a  risk-free  bond  in  compensation  for  the  risk 
involved.20 
Default  Risk  Explanatory  Variables  Used  in 
Tax-Exempt  Yield  Regression  Studies 
Cross-Section  Variables  In  discussing  the  ex- 
planatory  variables  designed  to  capture  the  effect  of 
default  risk  on  tax-exempt  yields,  it  is  useful  to 
distinguish  between  “cross-section”  and  “time-series” 
explanatory  variables.  While  tax-exempt  bond  yield 
studies  are  conceptually  cross-section  studies,  they 
frequently  use  data  that  cover  a  long  period  of  time. 
As  a result,  the  effect  of  default  risk  on  yield  may  not 
be  totally  captured  by  cross-section  variables.  The 
cross-section  and  time-series  variables  used  in  the 
various  studies  are  summarized  in  Table  VIII. 
Regression  studies  of  the  determinants  of  tax- 
exempt  bond  yields  have  used  one  of  two  approaches 
in  attempting  to  capture  the  effect  of  default  risk  at  a 
given  time  on  yields.  A  small  number  of  studies, 
interested  primarily  in  default  risk,  have  specified  the 
20 In  studies  of  yield  relationships  these  two  effects  are 
generally  combined  and  called  “default  risk  premiums.” 
Strictly  speaking  the  first  is  a  “default”  premium  to 
compensate  for  the  expected  loss  of  holding  a  risky  bond, 
while  the  second  is  a  “risk”  premium  to  provide  addi- 
tional  compensation  for  holding  a  risky  asset.  See 
Lawler  [38]. 
economic  and  fiscal  characteristics  of  the  issuer  be- 
lieved  to  influence  risk  premiums  and  entered  them 
directly  into  yield  regressions.  The  much  more 
common  procedure  is  to  instead  include  dummy  vari- 
ables  that  are  presumed  to  be  related  in  some  way  to 
the  underlying  economic  and  financial  characteristics 
of  the  issuers.  As  shown  in  Table  VIII,  by  far  the 
most  widespread  practice  in  this  regard  is  to  enter 
dummy  variables  for  the  various  rating  categories 
employed  by  one  or  both  of  the  two  major  rating 
agencies,  Moody’s  and  Standard  and  Poor’s.  It  has 
been  argued  in  a  number  of  articles  that  the  rating 
category  dummy  variables  do  not  adequately  capture 
cross-section  variations  in  default  risk.  In  particular, 
the  argument  has  been  made  that  within  a  given 
rating  category,  default  risk  of  revenue  bonds  varies 
systematically  by  purpose  of  issue,  i.e.,  whether  the 
bond is  issued  to  finance  universities,  hospitals, 
schools,  etc.,  (for  example,  see  [6,  22]).  Issue 
purpose  dummy  variables  have  been  included  to  cap- 
ture  this  effect.  A  third  cross-section  dummy  vari- 
able  tested  in  a  small  number  of  studies  has  been  the 
location  of  the  issuer. 
Time-Series  Variables  Default  risk  variables  that 
change  over  time  have  been  entered  as  explanatory 
variables  in  tax-exempt  bond  yield  regressions  pri- 
marily  to  allow  for  the  possibility  that  the  relation- 
ship  between  the  default  risk  premium  on  a bond  and 
its  rating  category  might  change  over  time.  This 
might  happen  if  economic  and  financial  conditions  of 
an  issuer  change  but  the  rating  agencies  do  not 
change,  or  are  slow  to  change,  their  ratings.  Or,  risk 
Table  VIII 
DEFAULT  RISK  EXPLANATORY  VARIABLES  USED  IN 
TAX-EXEMPT  BOND  YIELD  REGRESSIONS 
direct  measurer 
indirect  measures 
Cross  Section  Variables 
1.  economic  and  fiscal  characteristics  of  issuer 
[9,  10,  13,  24] 
1.  rating  category  dummy  variables 
[1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  11,  12,  14,  15, 
16,  17,  18,  19,  20,  21,  22,  23,  24,  25] 
2.  issue  purpose  dummy  variables 
[4,*  6,  7,  14,  16,*  19,*  20,*  22,  23*] 
3.  location  dummy  variables 
[8, 10] 
Time  Series  Variables 
1.  rating  category  dummy  variables  weighted 
by  spread  between  Moody’s  low-  and  high- 
rated  bond  yield  series  at  time  of  issue 
[8] 
2.  percentage  change  in  real  GNP 
[5,  19,  20,  21] 
3.  annual  dummy  variables 
[6] 
4.  Proposition  13-related  dummy  variables 
and  time  trends 
[2] 
*  In  these  studies  the  individual  purposes  were  grouped  into  aggregate  “high-”  and  “low-”  risk  purpose  categories. 
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directly  related  to  the  condition  of  the  issuer.  In  an 
attempt  to  deal  with  these  possibilities,  one  study  [8] 
used  a  variant  of  the  dummy  variable  method  in 
which  the  dummy  variables  were  weighted  by  yield 
spread  series  from  Moody’s.  For  instance,  the  Aa 
dummy  variable  was  weighted  by  the  spread  between 
Moody’s  Aa  and  Aaa  yield  series.  This  forces  the 
risk  premium  on  all  Aa-rated  bonds  in  the  sample  to 
conform  with  the  risk  premium  implied  by  Moody’s 
yield  series  at  the  date  of  issue.  As  shown  in  Table 
VIII,  other  approaches  to  this  problem  have  been  to 
include  the  percentage  change  in  real  GNP  or  simple 
annual  dummy  variables. 
Regression  Results 
Cross-Section  Variables  In  two  articles,  Browne 
and  Syron  [9,  10]  tested  for  the  effect  of  numerous 
economic  and  financial  characteristics  of  big  cities  on 
the  yields  of  their  general  obligation  bonds.  They 
found  that  a  city’s  unemployment  rate,  its  volume  of 
short-term  debt  per  capita,  its  ratio  of  pension  bene- 
fits  to  assets,  and  its  location  were  significant  deter- 
minants  of the  yield  on  its  bonds.  The  characteristics 
used  by  Hastie  [13]  to  capture  the  effect  of  default 
risk  on  the  yields  of  general  obligation  bond  yields  of 
local  governments  included  default  history,  the  ratio 
of  overall  debt  to  true  property  values,  and  a  measure 
of  economic  diversification. 
Virtually  all  the  studies  that  used  the  indirect 
dummy  variable  approach  found  the  rating  category 
of  the  issuer  to  be  the  most  important  determinant  of 
variations  in  yields  across  tax-exempt  bonds.  For 
instance,  the  Broaddus-Cook  study  included  dummy 
variables  for  bonds  rated  Aa,  A1,  A,  Baa1,  and  Baa. 
(The  omitted  category  was  Aaa-rated  bonds,  so  the 
coefficients  of  the  dummy  variables  are  interpreted 
as  the  increased  yield  relative  to  the  going  Aaa-rated 
bond  necessary  to  sell  the  bond.)  Over  the  sample 
period  covered  by  the  study  (1977-1978)  the  esti- 
mated  risk  premiums  for  bonds  at  the  lo-year  ma- 
turity  with  these  five  ratings  were  12,  33,  37,  55, 
and  75  basis  points,  respectively. 
The  studies  that  included  issue-purpose  dummy 
variables  generally  concluded  that  issue  purpose  for 
revenue  bonds  was  associated  with  variations  in  de- 
fault  risk  premiums  among  revenue  bonds  having 
the  same  rating.  Of  particular  interest  here  are  the 
studies  of  Bierwag,  Hopewell,  and  Kaufman  [6]  and 
Sorenson  [22]  both  of  which  included  over  ten  issue- 
purpose  dummy  variables.  Both  studies  found  that 
within  a given  revenue  bond  rating  category,  hospital, 
university,  and  housing  had  above  average  default 
risk  premiums  while  non-university  schools,  roads, 
and  utilities  had  below  average  risk  premiums.  Sor- 
enson  reasoned  that  the  important  difference  between 
the  two  groups  of  revenue  bonds  was  that  the  first 
group  of  issuers  compete  with  other  suppliers  of 
similar  products  or  services  and,  as  a  result,  their 
“future  revenue  flows  are  subjected  to  the  uncer- 
tainties  of  future  market  share."21 
Time-Series  Variables  In  all  those  studies  using 
it,  the  percentage  change  in  real  GNP  had  a  signifi- 
cant  and  negative  effect  on  a  bond’s  yield  relative  to 
the  going  Aaa  yield.  This  is  consistent  with  the 
widely  observed  phenomenon  that  risk  premiums  on 
bonds  of  a  given  rating  category  tend  to  widen  in 
periods  of  economic  weakness.  Similarly,  the  Broad- 
dus-Cook  regressions  were  modestly  improved  with 
the  rating  category  dummy  variables  weighted  by 
Moody’s  yield  spread  at  the  time  of  issue.  Beebe  [2], 
using  time  trends  and  dummy  variables  that  took 
on  a  value  of  one  after  certain  points  in  time,  found 
that  the  effect  of Proposition  13 on  the  risk  premiums 
of  California  municipal  bonds  varied  according  to  the 
type  of  bond  (general  obligation,  revenue,  tax  allo- 
cation,  or  lease-purchase). 
Default  Risk  and  Maturity  An  area  of  concern 
related  to  default  risk  is  the  relationship  of  default 
risk  premiums  to  term-to-maturity.  One  view  of 
this  relationship  is  that  default  risk  premiums 
demanded  by  investors  on  the  bonds  of  an  issuer 
with  a  given  rating  category  may  increase  with 
term-to-maturity  because  of  the  greater  uncertainty 
associated  with  promised  payments  further  out  into 
the  future.  An  alternative  view  is  that-at  least 
for  low-rated  issues-risk  premiums  may  be  larger 
the  shorter  the  term-to-maturity  of  bonds  of  a  given- 
rated  issuer  because  of  a  “crisis-at-maturity.”  The 
rationale  for  the  crisis-at-maturity  effect  on  risk 
premiums  for  lower  grade  bonds  is  that  “for  these 
grades,  the  probability  of  default  may  increase  as  the 
final  redemption  date  grows  nearer  and  the  company 
is  unable  to  improve  its  financial  condition”  [49,  p. 
166]. 
Van  Horne  [49]  surveyed  the  evidence  from  three 
studies  on  the  relation  between  risk  premiums  and 
maturity  in  the  corporate  bond  market  and  found 
that  evidence  from  two  of  the  three  supported  the 
notion  that  the  lower  the  grade  of  the  bond,  the 
higher  short-term  default  risk  premiums  are  in  rela- 
tion  to  long-term  risk  premiums,  consistent  with  the 
21 If  this  argument  is  valid,  the  puzzle  remains  as  to  why 
these  differences  are  not  captured  by  the  rating  agencies. 
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the  relationship  between  risk  structure  and  maturity 
can  change  over  time,  especially  during  economic 
downturns  when  crisis-at-maturity  may  grow  in 
importance. 
There  is  relatively  little  evidence  on  the  relation- 
ship  between  risk  premiums  and  maturity  in  the  tax- 
exempt  market.  Looking  at  data  for  the  1940s  and 
1950s,  Robinson  [47]  concluded  that  the  differential 
between  the  yields  of  Baa-rated  and  Aaa-rated  bonds 
widened  as  maturity  lengthens.  This  finding  is  not 
consistent  with  crisis-at-maturity  in  the  tax-exempt 
market  in  the  years  studied  by  Robinson. 
To  estimate  the  relationship  between  risk  and  ma- 
turity,  the  Broaddus-Cook  study  ran  regressions 
using  data  only  for  general  obligation  issues  that 
offered  bonds  at  each  of  the  5-,  10-,  15-,  and  20-year 
maturities.  Also  for  the  purposes  of  this  exercise 
the  default  risk  dummy  variables  alone  were  used  so 
that  the  coefficients  across  rating  categories  and  ma- 
turities  could  be  easily  compared.  The  coefficients 
for  the  five  categories  of  lower  than  Aaa-rated  bonds 
are  graphed  in  the  accompanying  chart  across 
the  four  maturities  for  which  regressions  were  esti- 
mated.  In  every  case  the  coefficients  of  a  particular 
rating  category  increase  with  maturity.  In  particular, 
risk  premiums  rise  at  least  as  much  from  the  5-  to 
10-year  maturity  for  the  low-grade  bonds  as  they  do 
for  the  high-grade  bonds.  Also,  the  slopes  of  the 
term-to-maturity  risk  premium  curves  generally  are 
steeper  the  lower  the  rating  category.  (Only  from 
Baa1-  to  Baa-rated  is  there  a  slight  drop  in  the 
slope.) 
While  there  was  no  recession  during  the  study’s 
sample  period,  risk  premiums  did  move  over  a  wide 
range  especially  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  the 
period.  As  a  second  test  of  the  crisis-at-maturity 
effect,  the  sample  was  divided  up  into  two  subsets, 
one  for  the  relatively  “high  risk”  period  and  one  for 
the  “low  risk”  period,  and  regressions  were  run  for 
both  subperiods.22  This  second  test  also  provided  no 
support  for  the  existence  of  a  crisis-at-maturity  for 
the  lower  rated  issues.  There  was  very  little  differ- 
ence  in  the  slopes  of  the  term-to-maturity  curves  for 
the  five  risk  categories  over  the  two  subperiods.  Both 
were  very  close  to  the  slopes  for  the  total  sample 
regressions  shown  in  the  chart. 
In  summary,  the  available  evidence  from  the  tax- 
exempt  market  is  that  the  relationship  between  risk 
premiums  and  maturity  is  positive  over  the  whole 
range  of  maturities.  Hence,  there  is  no  evidence  of  a 
crisis-at-maturity  effect  in  the  tax-exempt  market. 
However,  the  evidence  is  by  no  means  overwhelming 
since  the  only  regression  study  to  address  this  issue 
did  not  include  a  recession.  Also,  the  relationship 
between  risk  premiums  and  maturities  of  less  than 
five  years  was  not  studied. 
The  Effect  of  New  York  City  Default  on  Big  City 
Tax-Exempt  Bond  Risk  Premiums  A  final  question 
related  to  default  risk  that  has  received  some  atten- 
tion  from  a  small  number  of  the  studies  is  whether  or 
not  the  financial  crisis  of  New  York  City  in  1975  had 
an  effect  on  the  risk  premiums,  and  hence  on  the 
yields,  of bonds  issued  by  similar  Northern  industrial 
cities.  This  question  arose  when  the  crisis  spawned 
numerous  reports  (for  example  [42])  that  the  con- 
current  unfavorable  publicity  was  pushing  up  the 
borrowing  costs  of  other  Northern  industrial  cities. 
Three  of  the  studies  addressed  this  question  by 
doing  regressions  with  data  from  the  period  following 
the  crisis.  Browne  and  Syron  [9]  found  that  an 
equation  with  economic  and  financial  conditions  as 
explanatory  variables  understated  the  yields  of  four 
22 Specifically,  the  “high-risk”  period  covered  all  time 
periods  when  Moody’s  (Baa-Aaa)  spread  was  greater 
than  or  equal  to  78 basis  points  and  the  “low-risk”  period 
was  when  the  spread  was  less  than  78 basis  points.  The 
cut-off  point  of  78  basis  points  was  chosen  arbitrarily  to 
divide  the  sample  roughly  in  half. 
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points  each.  They  leaned  towards  the  conclusion  that 
the  market  demanded  a  premium  on  the  yields  of 
these  cities’  securities  because  of  the  intense  publicity 
following  the  New  York  crisis.  Browne  and  Syron 
[10]  conducted  a  follow-up  study  using  1978  data 
and  an  implication  of  this  study  was  that  the  unex- 
plained  risk  premium  in  the  yields  of  the  bonds  of 
Northern  industrial  cities  had  declined  considerably, 
if  not  disappeared. 
Broaddus  and  Cook  [8],  using  data  from  1977-78, 
attempted  to  analyze  the  question  by  incorporating  a 
dummy  variable  set  equal  to  one  for  the  issues  of  six 
large  Northern  industrial  cities:  Boston,  Chicago, 
Cleveland,  Detroit,  Philadelphia,  and  Pittsburgh.  The 
dummy  variable  had  a highly  significant  coefficient  of 
about  60  basis  points.  They  also  ran  regressions  with 
separate  dummy  variables  for  the  issues  of  each  of 
the  six  cities  individually  and  in  each  case  reported 
positive  and  significant  coefficients.  Broaddus  and 
Cook  attempted  to  gain  insight  into  the  cause  of  this 
result  by  comparing  Moody’s  ratings  at  the  end  of 
1981  for  the  30  Northern  industrial  city  issues  in 
their  sample  to  the  ratings  at  the  time  of  issue,  rea- 
soning  that  if  there  were  a  change  in  the  economic 
and  financial  conditions  of these  cities  not  reflected  in 
Moody’s  ratings  at  the  time  of  issue,  one  would  ex- 
pect  that  eventually  Moody’s  would  lower  their 
ratings.  In  fact,  the  ratings  of  15  of  the  30  issues 
were  lowered  subsequent  to  their  issue  date,  none 
were  raised  and  15  were  unchanged.  The  ratings  of 
the  cities  of  Boston,  Chicago,  Cleveland,  Detroit,  and 
Pittsburgh  were  all  lowered,  although  the  ratings  of 
some  of  their  associated  districts  were  unchanged. 
On  balance,  it  was  felt  that  the  only  conclusion  that 
could  be  drawn  from  these  results  was  that  much,  if 
not  most,  of  the  “unexplained”  risk  premiums  on 
issues  of  Northern  industrial  cities  in  the  study  re- 
flected  the  relatively  slow  reaction  of  Moody’s,  as 
compared  with  investors,  to  deteriorating  conditions 
in  those  cities. 
Finally,  a  study  by  Kidwell  and  Trzcinka  [20] 
using  data  from  the  summer  of  1975  concluded  upon 
analyzing  the  residuals  of  their  regressions  that  these 
results  “provide  marginal  support  that  the  New  York 
City  crisis  by  itself  led  to  higher  borrowing  costs  for 
other  municipalities  (Detroit,  Philadelphia,  Cleve- 
land).”  In  summary,  there  is  some  evidence  from  the 
regression  studies  that  the  New  York  financial  crisis 
had  a  temporary  effect  on  the  yields  of  securities  of 
similar  Northern  industrial  cities.  However,  there 
is  no  evidence  of  a  lasting  effect. 
III. 
UNDERWRITER  COMPETITION 
Underwriter  Conditions 
Almost  all  of  the  regression  studies  consider  a 
third  potential  source  of variation  in  tax-exempt  bond 
yields,  namely  the  marketing  conditions  of  the  bond. 
As  noted  earlier,  most  tax-exempt  issues  are  sold 
initially  by  the  issuer  to  an  underwriter  who  in  turn 
sells  them  to  the  public.  Bonds  can  be  sold  by  issuers 
to  underwriters  via  competitive  bidding  among  nu- 
merous  underwriting  syndicates  or  through  negoti- 
ation  with  only  one  syndicate.  Almost  all  general 
obligation  bonds  are  required  by  law  to  be  sold  via 
competitive  bidding,  while  revenue  bonds  are  sold 
both  by  competitive  bidding  and  through  negotiation. 
If  a  bond  is  sold  competitively  it  may  receive  as 
many  as  ten  bids  or  as  few  as  one.  Table  IX  shows 
the  number  of  bids  received  by  the  793  competitively 
sold  issues  in  the  sample  used  by  Broaddus  and  Cook 
[8].  The  median  number  of  bids  received  was  four. 
Table  IX  also  shows  the  number  of  bids  received  by 
rating  category,  illustrating  that  the  lower  rated 
issues  tend  to  receive  fewer  bids.  The  dispersion  of 
bids  received  by  an  issue  as  measured  by  the  variance 
or  range  of  bids  also  varies  greatly.  An  issue,  for 
example,  that  receives  four  bids  may  have  these  bids 
Table  IX 
NUMBER  OF  BIDS  ON  COMPETITIVE  ISSUES 
IN  SAMPLE 
(Moody’s  Ratings) 
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17  0  4  2 
113  12  22  16 
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Source:  Broaddus  and  Cook  [B]. 
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK  OF  RICHMOND  27 all  come  in  close  to  the  winning  bid  or  the  bids  may 
be  scattered  over  a  wide  range.  Table  X  shows  the 
range  of  bids  for  all  the  issues  in  the  sample  that 
received  four  bids. 
Another  underwriter  competition  characteristic  is 
the  issue’s  eligibility  to  be  underwritten  by  banks. 
Prior  to  1968,  the  Glass-Steagall  Act  of  1933  pre- 
vented  banks  from  underwriting  all  revenue  bonds. 
Hence,  revenue  bonds  could  be  used  as  a  proxy  for 
bank  eligibility  to  underwrite  a  given  issue.  The 
Housing  and  Urban  Development  Act  of  1968,  how- 
ever,  permitted  banks  to  underwrite  municipal  reve- 
nue  bonds  issued  to  finance  housing,  university,  or 
dormitory  projects.  Further,  the  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency  may  rule  that  a  municipal  revenue  bond  is 
in  effect  a  general  obligation  bond  eligible  to  be 
underwritten  by  national  banks  if  the  bond  is  backed 
by  the  full  faith  and  credit  of  the  issuer.  According 
to  the  Public  Securities  Association  [44],  40  percent 
of  the  revenue  bonds  issued  in  1979  were  eligible  for 
bank  underwriting. 
This  discussion  points  to  four  underwriter  condi- 
tions  that  vary  across  issues:  (1)  method  of  sale, 
i.e.,  competitive  bidding  versus  negotiation;  (2)  the 
number  of  bids  received  by  competitive  issues;  (3) 
the  dispersion  of  bids;  and  (4)  bank  underwriter 
eligibility.  Various  studies  have  included  one  or 
more  of  these  variables  as  explanatory  variables  in 
tax-exempt  yield  regressions. 
Before  proceeding  with  a  discussion  of  why  under- 
writer  conditions  are  thought  to  influence  tax-exempt 
yields,  it  is  useful  to  recall  that  many  regression 
studies  have  used  measures  such  as  NIC  or  TIC 
which  represent  the  total  cost  to  an  issuer  of  selling 
Table  X 
DISTRIBUTION  BY  RANGE  OF  BIDS  OF 
ISSUES  RECEIVING  FOUR  BIDS 
Number  of 









greater than  .40  7 
Total  136 
Source:  Broaddus and  Cook  [8]. 
bonds,  including  both  the  underwriter  spread  plus 
the  yield  earned  by  the  investor.  This  is  a  compli- 
cation  in  interpreting  the  coefficients  of  the  under- 
writer  competition  variables  because  there  are  a 
priori  reasons,  confirmed  by  empirical  evidence  (for 
example,  see  Kessel  [17]),  to  expect  that  these  vari- 
ables  affect  not  only  yields  to  maturity  but  also 
underwriter  spreads.  Hence  the  coefficients  of  these 
variables  may  reflect  the  behavior  of  the  underwriter 
or  the  investor  or  both.  For  that  reason,  when  pos- 
sible,  the  focus  in  this  section  is  generally  on  those 
studies  that  used  reoffering  yields  to  maturity. 
Regression  Results  and  Search  Theory  as  a 
Possible  Explanation 
Kessel’s  Paper  and  the  Number  of  Bids  as  a 
"Determinant”  of  the  Reoffer  Yield  on  Competitively 
Sold  Bonds  In  early  1971,  Kessel  [17]  presented  an 
argument  explaining  why  underwriter  competition 
affects  reoffering  yields  to  maturity.  He  also  pre- 
sented  evidence  from  a  regression  model  in  support 
of  his  argument.  His  major  empirical  finding  was 
that  the  number  of  bids  on  competitively  sold  issues 
is  negatively  related  to  reoffering  yields.  This  result 
has  held  up  remarkably  well  in  subsequent  studies, 
and,  until  recently,  his  rationale  for  this  relationship 
was  widely  accepted.  For  this  reason,  it  is  useful  to 
begin  with  a  discussion  of  Kessel’s  theory.  The 
criticisms  of  his  explanation  will  be  discussed  below. 
Kessel  employed  George  Stigler’s  thesis  regarding 
search  and  the  economic  value  of  information  to 
argue  that  an  increase  in  the  number  of  underwriters 
bidding  on  an  issue  would  reduce  the  reoffering  yield 
at  which  the  issue  could  be  sold  to  investors.23  Spe- 
cifically,  Kessel  hypothesized  that  information  re- 
garding  potential  buyers  of  a  new  municipal  issue 
varied  across  underwriters.  Each  underwriter  knew 
some  prospective  buyers  not  identified  by  other 
underwriters.  On  this  basis,  Kessel  suggested  that 
the  number  of  bids  was  a  proxy  for  the  extent  to 
which  prospective  final  buyers  of  an  issue  had  been 
identified  and  informed  about  an  issue:  the  larger 
the  number  of  bids,  the  greater  the  search  and  there- 
fore  the  lower  the  reoffer  yield. 
23 An  earlier  study  by  West  [SO]  concluded  that  large 
issues  receiving  one  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  two  bids  have 
higher  reoffering  yields  because  of  monopsony  in the 
underwriting  and  distribution  of  these  securities.  How- 
ever,  West  also  concluded  that  the  number  of  inde- 
pendent  buyers  necessary  to  assure  most  of  the  benefits 
of  competition  is  quite  small  and  issuers,  in  any  case,  can 
take  precautions  to  protect  themselves  from  monopso- 
nistic  behavior  by  underwriters. 
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on  reoffering  yields  implied  by  Kessel’s  regression 
results  is  substantial.  His  coefficient  for  the  natural 
logarithm  of bids  was  -.14,  which  implies  that  issues 
receiving  five  and  ten  bids  carry  reoffer  yields  23 
and  32  basis  points  lower,  respectively,  than  an  issue 
receiving  only  one  bid.  In  all  subsequent  studies  in 
which  the  number  of  bids  has  been  tested  it  has  been 
found  to  be  a  significant  determinant  of  reoffering 
yields,  even  though  these  studies  have  covered  widely 
varying  time  periods  [5,  8,  11,  12,  20].24  The  re- 
ported  coefficients  have  been  equal  to  or  greater  than 
Kessel’s. 
Dispersion  of Bids  In  an  attempt  to  extend  the 
Kessel  thesis,  Benson  [4]  argued  that  the  number  of 
bids  captures  only  part  of  the  total  effect  of  under- 
writer  search  on  municipal  bond  yields.  Specifically, 
he  argued  that  the  intensity  of  underwriter  search 
varied  across  issues  receiving  the  same  number  of 
bids  due  to  variations  in  underwriter  expectations  of 
the  benefits  and  costs  of  search.  Benson  assumed 
that  the  intensity  of  search  varied  inversely  with  the 
dispersion  of bids.  On  the  grounds  that  more  intense 
search  should  uncover  buyers  willing  to  accept  lower 
yields,  Benson  hypothesized  a  positive  correlation 
between  municipal  yields  and  the  variance  of  bids. 
His  findings  supported  his  hypothesis  in  the  case  of 
general  obligation  bonds,  but  not  in  the  case  of  reve- 
nue  bonds.25  One  other  study  [8]  included  a  mea- 
sure  of  the  dispersion  of  bids-the  range  of  bids--as 
an  explanatory  variable.  The  coefficient  had  the 
correct  (i.e.,  positive)  sign  and  was  highly  significant 
in  each  of  the  full  sample  regressions. 
Negotiated  versus  Competitive  A  third  under- 
writer  competition  variable  tested  in  a limited  number 
of  studies  including  both  competitively  sold  and  ne- 
gotiated  issues  is  a  dummy  variable  denoting  the 
bond’s  sale  through  negotiation.  Of  the  three  studies 
reporting  regressions  with  a  negotiated  dummy  vari- 
able  [2,  8,  14],  only  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8]  found  a 
significant  relationship.  The  coefficients  of  the  ne- 
gotiated  dummy  variable  ranged  between  11  and  15 
basis  points  in  the  full  sample  regressions. 
Joehnk  and  Kidwell  [34]  analyzed  a  sample  of  730 
paired  competitive  and  negotiated  bonds  issued  be- 
24 Not  discussed  here  are  those  studies  that  used  NIC 
or  TIC  as  the  dependent  variable.  All  13 of  these  studies 
that  included  the  number  of  bids  also  reported  a  signifi- 
cant  coefficient.  These  studies  are  listed  in  the  refer- 
ences. 
25 Benson’s  dependent  variable  was  TIC. 
tween  1970  and  1976  and  found  that  the  mean  10- 
year  reoffering  yield  for  negotiated  issues  exceeded 
the  corresponding  mean  yield  for  competitive  issues 
by  23  and  27  basis  points,  respectively,  in  the  case  of 
general  obligation  and  revenue  bonds.26  They  found 
this  difference  in  yields  consistent  with  the  hypothe- 
sis  that  monopoly  powers  may  exist  with  issues  sold 
through  negotiation.  An  alternative  explanation  fol- 
lowing  the  search  thesis,  is  that  underwriters  that 
do  not  go  through  the  competitive  bidding  process 
might  conduct  a  less  thorough  search  for  buyers  than 
competitive  underwriters.  (A  third  interpretation 
will  be  given  below.) 
Bank  Eligibility  A  fourth  underwriter  competition 
variable  that  has  been  tested  in  a  small  number  of 
studies  of  revenue  bond  yields  is  bank  eligibility  to 
underwrite  the  bond.  Cagan  [11,  12]  found  bank 
eligibility  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  reoffering 
yields  of  negotiated  revenue  issues  and  used  Kessel’s 
search  theory  to  explain  this  result.27  Bierwag, 
Hopewell,  and  Kaufman  [6],  however,  argued  that 
bank  eligibility  is  correlated  with  issue  purpose 
among  revenue  bonds  and  that  Cagan’s  result  largely 
reflected  the  absence  of  issue  purpose  variables  in 
his  regression.  When  they  introduced  issue  purpose 
dummy  variables  into  Cagan’s  regressions,  the  coeffi- 
cient  of bank  eligibility  was  no  longer  significant.  In 
an  earlier  study,  Hopewell  and  Kaufman  [16]  re- 
ported  a  negative  coefficient  significant  at  the  15 
percent  level  for  bank  eligibility. 
The  Attack  on  Search  Theory 
While  search  theory  is  perhaps  an  intuitively  plaus- 
ible  explanation  of  the  correlation  between  under- 
writer  competition  variables  and  reoffer  yields,  its 
application  is  vulnerable  to  criticism  because  it  fails 
to  explain  why  some  issues  receive  more  bids  than 
others.  Critics  argue  that  on  this  point  the  search 
theory  explanation  for  the  correlation  between  under- 
writer  competition  variables  and  reoffer  yields  falls 
26 Sorenson  [23]  argued  that  the  effect  of  negotiation  on 
yields  differs  according  to  the  riskiness  of  the  bond. 
Specifically,  Sorenson  estimated  that  negotiation  actually 
reduced  the  NIC  of  lower  rated  issues. 
27 The  literature  on  the  effect  of  bank  eligibility  on  reve- 
nue  bond  yields  is  voluminous  and  this  article  was  unable 
to  deal  with  the  issue  in  any  depth.  Major  combatants  in 
the  debate  are  Bierwag,  Hopewell,  Kaufman,  and 
Leonard  [6,  7]  and  Mussa  [40,  41]  on  the  side  that  bank 
eligibility  does  not  lower  yields  and  Cagan  [11,  12]  and 
Silber  [48]  on  the  side  that  bank  eligibility  does  reduce 
yields. 
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argued  that  the  number  of  bids  is  related  to  invest- 
ment  quality  [41]: 
.  .  .  underwriters  will  undertake  costly  search  and 
marketing  activities  only  if  they  are  adequately 
compensated  for  the  costs  incurred  in  such  activi- 
ties.  For  some  bond  issues,  the  search  and  market- 
ing  costs  will  be  low.  These  will  typically  be  issues 
of  well  known  borrowers  with  impeccable  credit, 
particularly  general  obligation  bonds  issued  by 
states  and  localities  with  high  credit  ratings.  On 
intuitive  grounds,  one  might  expect  that  such  issues 
would  attract  a  large  number  of  bids  because  the 
cost  of  marketing  is  low.  For  such  issues,  the  po- 
tential  bidder  does  not  need  to  engage  in  a  costly 
search  for  potential  customers  in  advance  of  mak- 
ing  his  bid.  As  one  of  many  bidders  his  costs  must 
be  low  because  his  chance  of  winning  is  also  low 
and  he  runs  the  risk  of  failing  to  recover  these  costs 
if  he  is  a  losing  bidder.  In  contrast,  issues  by  less 
well  known  or  less  credit  worthy  borrowers  are 
likely  to  attract  fewer  bids  because  the  costs  of 
ascertaining  a  reasonable  bid  for  such  issues  is 
greater  than  for  issues  with  a  ready  market. 
In  support  of  the  contention  that  the  number  of  bids 
is  related  to  investment  quality,  the  critics  of  search 
theory  point  to  the  information  shown  earlier  in 
Table  IX  that  higher  rated  issues,  on  average,  receive 
more  bids. 
The  second  part  of  the  criticism  is  that  variables 
included  in  tax-exempt  yield  regressions  to  capture 
variations  in  default  risk  are  crude  measures  that  fail 
to  differentiate  between  issues  of  significantly  differ- 
ent  quality.  As  shown  in  Section  II,  the  standard 
way  to  capture  default  risk  in  tax-exempt  yield  re- 
gressions  is  to  ‘use  dummy  variables  corresponding 
to  the  rating  categories  of  the  rating  agencies.  These 
categories  can  cover  a  fairly  wide  ground  in  terms  of 
basis  points.  The  critics  of  search  theory  argue  that 
the  number  of  bids  is  in  fact  correlated  with  differ- 
ences  in  “intrinsic  quality”  across  bonds  not  captured 
by  the  rating  category  dummy  variables. 
Mussa  [41]  asserted  that  evidence  in  support  of 
the  argument  that  the  coefficient  of  bids  reflects 
quality  differences  is  the  larger  estimated  effect  of 
bids  on  tax-exempt  yields  during  periods  (such  as 
1973)  when  there  are  large  disparities  among  yields. 
Broaddus  and  Cook  ran  regressions  for  two  sub- 
periods  when  the  spread  between  Moody’s  Baa  and 
Aaa  yield  series  was  relatively  high  and  when  it  was 
relatively  low.28  The  average  coefficient  for  the 
natural  logarithm  of  bids  in  the  high-risk  period  was 
.1885  while  the  average  coefficient  in  the  low-risk 
28 These  regressions  were  described  in  Section  II. 
period  was  .1005.  These  results,  reported  in  detail  in 
[8],  are  consistent  with  Mussa’s  contention.29 
The  above  argument  is  essentially  that  the  number 
of  bids  is  correlated  with  a  “missing  variable”  related 
to  default  risk.  A  second  and  equally  plausible 
“missing  variable”  argument  is  that  number  of  bids 
is  correlated  with  marketability  of  an  issue.30  There 
are  great  differences  in  the  marketability  of  tax- 
exempt  issues.  Some  have  well  developed  secondary 
markets,  while  others  have  virtually  no  secondary 
markets.  The  bid-ask  dealer  spread  on  tax-exempt 
bonds  with  poor  secondary  markets  is  huge  (e.g.,  as 
much  as  $5  per  hundred),  which  means  that  an  in- 
vestor  needing  to  sell  such  a  bond  prior  to  maturity 
has  to  take  a  large  loss.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume 
that  investors  demand  a  higher  yield  in  compensation 
for  this  lack  of  marketability.  Likewise,  it  is  also 
very  plausible  that  the  less  marketable  an  issue  the 
more  search-and  hence  the  more  cost-has  to  be 
done  by  underwriters  before  making  a  bid.  If  this  is 
the  case,  then  the  number  of  bids  would  be  highly  and 
positively  correlated  with  marketability.  Since  the 
tax-exempt  yield  regressions  specify  at  best  very 
crude  explanatory  variables  to  capture  the  effect  of 
marketability,  the  number  of  bids  may  be  capturing 
this  effect.31 
One  might  argue  that  proponents  of  the  “missing 
variables”  explanation  should  specify  appropriate 
explanatory  variables  to  capture  the  effects  they  claim 
are  correlated  with  the  underwriter  competition  vari- 
ables.  This  would  be  difficult  to  do,  however.  There 
are  no  available  direct  measures  of  marketability  (i.e., 
bid-ask  spreads),  especially  for  new  issues,  and  the 
whole  reason  the  rating  category  dummy  variables 
have  been  used  in  regression  studies  is  that  the  alter- 
native  of  specifying  numerous  economic  and  financial 
characteristics  of  the  issuer  would  be  extremely 
cumbersome.  In  any  case,  both  the  search  theory  and 
missing  variables  explanations  for  the  relationship 
between  underwriter  competition  and  reoffering 
yields  are  essentially  ex  post  explanations  for  an 
unexpected  result.  The  reader  has  to  choose  between 
the  two  on  the  basis  of  which  is  most  plausible. 
29 However,  proponents  of  search  theory  might  argue 
that  this  difference  in  coefficients  is  also  consistent  with 
search  theory.  See  [8]. 
30 Actually  Mussa  also  seems  to  imply  this.  Hastie  [13] 
uses  number  of  bids  as  a  proxy  for  marketability. 
31 The  argument  here  is  for  number  of  bids.  However,  it 
could  also  be  applied  to  the  negotiated  dummy  variable 
and  the  dispersion  of  bids.  In  particular,  it  has  been 
reported  that  negotiated  sales  are  often  used  by  “lesser 
known”  issuers [44].  If  so,  negotiated  issues  would  in 
general  have  poorer  marketability  than  competitive  issues. 
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REGIONAL  MARKET  CONDITIONS 
The  Argument  for  an  Effect  of  Regional  Market 
Conditions  on  Tax-Exempt  Bond  Yields 
A  small  number  of studies  have  considered  regional 
market  conditions  as  a  determinant  of  tax-exempt 
yields.  (For  reasons  explained  below,  in  all  cases 
the  region  focused  on  is  the  state.)  A  priori,  one 
would  expect  arbitrage  by  investors  to  eliminate  all 
but  very  temporary  differentials  between  the  yields 
to  maturity  on  comparable  bonds  issued  in  different 
regions.  The  essence  of  the  argument  that  arbitrage 
may  not  eliminate  all  interregional  yield  differentials 
is  that  investors  inside  and  outside  a  region  are 
subject  to  different  costs,  taxes,  and  other  consider- 
ations  that  create  a  gap  between  the  observed  yield 
to  maturity  on  a  region’s  bonds  and  the  true  yield 
earned  by  investors  inside  versus  outside  the  region.32 
Specifically,  there  are  three  factors  which  may  affect 
in-state  investors  differently  from  out-of-state  in- 
vestors  :  information  costs,  differential  taxes,  and 
commercial  bank  pledging  requirements. 
Information  Costs  The  first  and  most  widely  cited 
reason  why  regional  market  conditions  may  affect 
tax-exempt  bond  yields  is  information  costs.  As 
noted  earlier,  many  municipal  bond  issues  are  rela- 
tively  small  and  are  handled  by  local  or  regional 
underwriters  that  sell  primarily  in  local  or  regional 
markets.  The  cost  to  an  investor  of  obtaining  infor- 
mation  about,  say,  a  local  sewer  bond  issued  in  a 
different  state  might  be  considerable.  Similarly,  the 
cost  to  an  underwriter  (and  hence  to  an  issuer)  of 
searching  for  and  identifying  distant  buyers  for  the 
bond  might  also  be  considerable.  If  these  costs  are 
significant,  then  the  yields  on  bonds  in  a  region  could 
deviate  from  the  “going”  yields  on  similar  bonds  out- 
side  the  region  without  triggering  interregional  arbi- 
trage. 
Taxes  The  second  reason  why  in-state  investors 
are  willing  to  accept  lower  yields  on  in-state  bonds  is 
that  income  from  a  municipal  bond  is  typically  ex- 
empt  from  state  and  local  income  taxes  within  the 
state  of  issue  but  not  in  other  states.  As  a  result 
the  true  after-tax  yield  on  a  bond  with  a  given 
before-tax  yield  is  different  for  in-state  and  out-of- 
state  investors.  This  creates  the  incentive  for  in- 
vestors  to  buy  tax-exempt  bonds  issued  within  their 
32 The  theory  behind  the  existence  of  “regional  market 
segmentation”  in  the  tax-exempt  bond  market  has  not 
been  rigorously  formulated.  This  explanation  is  from  [8]. 
own  state.  The  tax  rates  applicable  to  individual  in- 
vestors  in  each  state  vary  over  a  great  range  from  0 
to  over  15  percent,33  In  Virginia,  for  example,  an 
individual  investor  earning  7.6  percent  on  an  in-state 
issue  would  require  over  8  percent  on  an  out-of-state 
issue  to  get  the  same  after-tax  yield.  Hence,  if  the 
out-of-region  yield  were  8  percent,  yields  in  Virginia 
would  have  to  fall  below  7.6  percent  before  Virginia 
investors  would  be  induced  to  buy  non-Virginia 
bonds.  Conversely,  if  the  yield  on  Virginia  bonds 
were  7.6  percent  the  yield  on  out-of-region  bonds 
would  have  to  rise  above  8  percent  before  Virginia 
investors  would  be  induced  to  buy  non-Virginia 
bonds.  This  creates  a  range  of  40  basis  points  over 
which  Virginia  bond  yields  could  move  in  response 
to  regional  market  conditions  without  inducing  inter- 
regional  arbitrage. 
Pledging  Requirements  A  third  factor  that  may 
permit  regional  market  conditions  to  affect  individual 
bond  yields  in  a  given  state  is  the  effect  of  state  and 
local  “pledging”  requirements  at  commercial  banks 
against  state  and  local  deposits  in  that  state.  Some 
states  require  banks  to  hold  securities  equal  to  100 
percent  or  more  of the  value  of their  deposit  liabilities 
to  the  state  and  its  political  subdivisions.  Other  states 
have  less  stringent  requirements,  and  still  others  have 
no  requirements.  or  very  low  requirements.  Those 
states  that  impose  such  requirements  invariably 
accept  as  eligible  collateral  U.  S.  government  and 
agency  securities  and  securities  issued  by  the  state  in 
question  and  its  political  subdivisions.  Most  states, 
however,  do  not  accept  out-of-state  municipal  securi- 
ties  as  eligible  collateral  [28].  Hence,  banks  in  states 
with  high  pledging  requirements  must  purchase  sub- 
stantial  amounts  of  in-state  issues  or  Federal  securi- 
ties  if  they  wish  to  acquire  public  deposits.34  Conse- 
quently,  banks  may  be  willing  to  accept  a  lower  yield 
on  in-state  bonds  than  on  out-of-state  bonds  in  order 
to  gain  the  return  associated  with  attracting  public 
deposits.35 
In  summary,  information  costs,  differential  state 
income  tax  treatment  of  in-state  and  out-of-state  mu- 
nicipal  bond  interest,  and  differential  treatment  of 
in-state  and  out-of-state  municipal  bonds  for  pledging 
33 See  [27]. 
34 Studies that  have  examined  the  effects  of  pledging 
requirements  on  bank  behavior  are  [1,  28,  29,  46]. Most 
recently,  Ratti  [46]  found  that  the  demand  by  banks  for 
state  and  local  securities  is  greater  as  a  result  of  the 
presence  of  pledging  requirements. 
35  The  pledging  requirements  in  the  various  states  as  of 
1979 are  summarized  in  [28]. 
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given  region’s  yields  move  in  response  to  regional 
supply  and  demand  factors  without  inducing  arbi- 
trage  activity.  This  phenomenon  has  often  been 
referred  to  as  “market  segmentation”-a  term  that 
explains  little  and  that  conjures  up  the  image  of  in- 
vestors  too  lazy,  ignorant,  or  irrational  to  arbitrage 
away  interest  rate  differentials  across  regions.  The 
point  here  is  that  information  costs,  state  income 
taxes,  and  pledging  regulations  may  prevent  this 
arbitrage  by  creating  gaps  between  the  true  after-tax 
yields  earned  by  investors  inside  and  outside  a  region 
on  that  region’s  bonds. 
Regression  Results 
Before  proceeding  with  the  results  of  the  studies 
that  have  incorporated  regional  variables,  a  few  pre- 
liminary  comments  are  necessary.  First,  as  noted 
above,  in  all  these  studies  the  “regional”  market  used 
was  the  state.  This  is  because  the  pledging  and  tax 
arguments  relate  specifically  to  the  state  and  because 
“regional’:  data  are  available  only  on  a  state  basis. 
Second,  the  argument  has  been  made  that,  to  the 
extent  that  regional  conditions  influence  tax-exempt 
yields,  the  effect  should  be  inversely  related  to  the 
size  of  the  issue  [15].  The  essence  of  this  argument 
is  that  unit  information  costs  decline  as  issue  size 
rises  because  the  relatively  fixed  costs  of  acquiring 
information  about  an  issue  in  another  region  are 
spread  over  more  dollars  and  the  effect  on  yield  is 
smaller.  Third,  the  argument  has  also  been  made 
that  the  effect  of  regional  variables--especially  those 
related  to  the  pledging  effect-might  vary  inversely 
with  maturity  [8].  This  is  because  banks  which  are 
the  major  holder  of  tax-exempt  bonds,  purchase  pri- 
marily  short-  and  intermediate-term  bonds  with  ma- 
turities  generally  not  exceeding  15  years. 
Demand  Variables:  The  Pledging  Effect  In 
theory,  if  the  pledging  requirements,  state  income 
taxes,  and  information  costs  create  a  situation  in 
which  yields  in  a  region  can  move  over  a  range  with- 
out  triggering  interregional  arbitrage,  then  anything 
affecting  the  demand  for  or  supply  of  bonds  in  a 
given  region  might  affect  yields  in  that  region  rela- 
tive  to  the  “national”  yield.  In  practice,  the  only 
demand  variable  that  has  been  tested  in  the  tax- 
exempt  yield  regressions  is  bank  demand  related  to 
pledging  requirements.  Two  studies  have  examined 
this  effect  on  tax-exempt  yields.  The  first  [1]  which 
was  part  of a larger  study  of  public  deposit  insurance 
for  the  Advisory  Commission  on  Intergovernmental 
Relations  (ACIR),  included  dummy  variables  con- 
structed  to  measure  the  pledging  effect.  The  pledging 
dummies  were  based  on  a  classification  of  states  into 
“high-pledge,”  “moderate-pledge,”  and  “low-pledge” 
categories.  The  results  of the  analysis  suggested  that 
pledging  requirements  reduced  NIC  of  general  obli- 
gation  bonds  in  the  high-pledge  states  by  5  to  20 
basis  points  relative  to  those  in  the  low-pledge  states. 
Further,  the  effect  appeared  to  be  more  consistently 
significant  in  the  latter  part  of  the  1966-1974  period 
covered  due  to  the  apparent  substitution  of  municipal 
for  Treasury  and  agency  securities  as  collateral  for 
public  deposits  by  banks  in  the  late  1960s  and  early 
1970s. 
The  dummy  variable  included  to  measure  the 
pledging  effect  in  the  ACIR  study  differentiated 
among  states  only  on  the  basis  of  the  character  of 
their  pledging  requirements,  It  took  no  account  of 
differences  in  the  proportion  of  short-term  assets  held 
by  state  and  local  government  units  solely  in  the  form 
of  bank  deposits.  However,  both  the  stringency  of 
pledging  requirements  and  the  relative  share  of  gov- 
ernment  funds  held  in  bank  deposits  are  relevant. 
For  this  reason  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8]  used  the  per- 
centage  of  total  deposits  in  a  state  subject  to  pledging 
requirements.  This  pledging  variable  worked  well  in 
the  full  sample  and  general  obligation  bond  regres- 
sions.  Its  coefficients  had  the  expected  sign  and  were 
highly  significant  at  the  5-,  10-,  and  15-year  maturi- 
ties.  The  coefficient  was  much  smaller  and  was  not 
significant  in  the  20-year  regressions.  This  pattern 
was  not  unexpected  since  banks  are  less  important 
participants  at  the  long  end  of  the  market.  The 
pledging  variable  was  not  significant  in  any  of  the 
revenue  bond  equations.  This  result  may  reflect  the 
ineligibility  of  revenue  bonds  as  collateral  in  some 
states  with  high  pledging  requirements. 
The  Broaddus-Cook  study  also  tested  for  the  effect 
of  size  by  adding  a  multiplicative  term  of  the  pledg- 
ing  variable  times  the  logarithm  of  the  size  of  the 
issue.  This  multiplicative  term  had  the  expected  sign 
and  was  significant  at  the  5-,  10-,  and  15-year  ma- 
turities  in  the  full  sample  and  general  obligation 
equations,  where  the  basic  pledging  effect  exists.  The 
results  suggest  that  at  the  10-year  maturity,  for  ex- 
ample,  relatively  high  pledging  requirements  reduce 
reoffer  yields  on  the  order  of  30  basis  points  for  small 
issues  to  10  basis  points  or  less  for  issues  exceeding 
$200  million. 
Supply  Variables  Three  studies  have  tested  the 
effects  of  regional  supply  variables  on  tax-exempt 
bond  yields  and  all  three  found  them  to  be  significant 
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standard  regression  model  (with  NIC  as  dependent 
variable)  to  estimate  regional  supply  effects  on  yields 
of  bonds  issued  in  Indiana  between  1970  and  1974. 
Their  supply  variable  was  the  recent  volume  of  new 
municipal  securities  issued  by  Indiana  government 
units  relative  to  the  recent  volume  of  new  issues  in 
the  national  market.  They  also  included  the  supply 
variable  multiplied  by  the  logarithm  of  issue  size. 
The  supply  variable  coefficient  was  positive  and  the 
coefficient  on  the  multiplicative  term  was  negative. 
Both  were  significant  at  the  one  percent  level.  They 
concluded  that  a  regional  supply  effect  existed,  but 
that  the  effect  was  inversely  related  to  issue  size. 
Both  the  ACIR  [1]  and  the  Broaddus-Cook  [8] 
studies  included  as  a  supply  variable  the  ratio  of  the 
currently  outstanding  stock  of  state  and  local  bonds 
to  state  personal  income.36  In  the  ACIR  study  this 
variable  was  significant  and  had  the  expected  positive 
sign  in  a  majority  of  the  regressions.  The  coeffi- 
cients  in  the  Broaddus-Cook  regressions  also  had  the 
expected  positive  sign  and  were  highly  significant  in 
all  of  the  full  sample  equations.  Since  this  variable 
measures  the  outstanding  stock  of  regional  bonds 
rather  than  the  flow  of new  issues,  these  results  imply 
that  an  increase  in  the  supply  of  regional  issues  has  a 
permanent  effect  on  the  yields  of  new  regional  issues 
as  long  as  the  increase  is  reflected  in  a  rise  in  the 
ratio  of  the  stock  of  regional  issues  to  regional  in- 
come.  This  implication  differs  somewhat  from  the 
results  of  Hendershott  and  Kidwell’s  analysis,  which 
was  inconclusive  on  this  point. 
V. 
OTHER  VARIABLES  EMPLOYED  IN  TAX-EXEMPT 
YIELD  REGRESSIONS 
Size  of  Issue37 
Theories  of  the  Effect  of  Issue  Size  on  Reoffering 
Yield  Issue  size  has  been  included  as  an  explanatory 
variable  in  about  three-fourths  of  the  tax-exempt 
yield  regression  studies  (see  references).  However, 
only  a  handful  of  these  studies  have  attempted  to 
articulate  the  expected  relationship  between  issue  size 
and  tax-exempt  yields  and  even  these  few  studies  offer 
diverse  hypotheses  of  the  relationship.  Tanner  [25] 
argued  that  supply  effects  would  drive  up  yields  on 
large  issues  because  the  demand  curve  for  any  par- 
ticular  issue  is  downward  sloping.  Benson,  Kidwell, 
Koch,  and  Rogowski  [5]  agreed  that  these  supply 
effects  exist,  but  they  argued  that  the  size  of  issue  is 
also  a  proxy  for  marketability.  They  argued  that 
marketability  increases  with  issue  size  and  investors 
will  accept  a lower  yield  in  return  for  greater  market- 
ability.  Hence,  the  marketability  effect  of  size  on 
yield  is  the  opposite  of the  supply  effect.  They  postu- 
lated  that  the  marketability  effect  initially  would 
dominate,  but  that  at  some  issue  size  the  supply  effect 
becomes  dominant.  Hence,  “the  expected  relation- 
ship  between  yield  and  size  may  be  U-shaped.“38 
Problem  in  Interpreting  the  Coefficient  of  Issue 
Size  Before  summarizing  the  regression  results  of 
the  effect  of issue  size  on  yields  two  problems  that  are 
encountered  in  interpreting  the  coefficients  of  size 
should  be  discussed.  First,  size  of  issue  is  generally 
viewed  as  being  a  determinant  of  underwriter  spread 
which  is  a  component  of  NIC  and  TIC.  Conse- 
quently,  in  those  tax-exempt  yield  regressions  that 
use  NIC  or  TIC  as  the  dependent  variable,  the 
coefficient  of  issue  size  may  reflect  the  behavior  of 
underwriters  or  the  behavior  of  investors.39 
This  section  will  discuss  a  small  number  of  vari- 
ables  that  do  not  fit  easily  into  the  above  four  cate- 
gories.  Two  of  these-issue  size  and  general 
obligation  versus  revenue  bond  status-have  been 
used  in  numerous  studies,  yet  the  expected  effect  on 
yields  has  either  generally  not  been  discussed,  or 
remains  a  matter  of  controversy.  Also,  there  are  a 
couple  of  recent  articles  that  have  argued  for  the 
existence  of  market  segmentation  by  type  of  bond 
that  will  be  discussed  briefly  at  the  end  of  the  section. 
36 Actually,  in  the  ACIR  study  this  variable  was  inter- 
preted  as  both  a  regional  supply  variable  and  a  default 
risk  variable  [1,  p.  520]. 
37 This  discussion  is  concerned  exclusively  with  the  direct 
effect  of  issue  size  on  yield.  Size  may  also  effect  yields 
through  its  interaction  with  regional  market  variables. 
See  Section  IV. 
38 A  third  rather  tenuous  hypothesis  was  offered  by 
Kessel  [17]  who  found  an  unexpected  negative  relation- 
ship  between  size  and  yield,  and  argued  that  the  relation- 
ship  reflected  a weakness  in  the  use  of  number  of  bids  as 
a  proxy  for  underwriter  search.  Specifically,  he  argued 
that,  ceteris  paribus,  larger  underwriters  do  more  search 
than  smaller  underwriters.  Also  larger  underwriters  tend 
to  bid  on  large  issues.  Hence,  issue  size  captures  the 
additional  search  on  a given  issue  as  opposed  to  a  smaller 
one  with  the  same  number  of  bids. 
39 To  complicate  things  further,  issue  size  is  also  used 
as  an  explanatory  variable  in  equations  attempting  to 
explain  the  number  of  bids  received  by  a  competitively 
sold  issue.  Hence,  issue  size  is  thought  to  affect  under- 
writer  spread  both  directly  and  indirectly  through  its 
effect  on  the  number  of  bids.  (See  Kessel  [17].) 
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of  issue  size  is  that,  in  all  but  one  of  the  regression 
studies,  size  is  measured  in  nominal  terms.  This  is 
relevant  because  the  theories  of  the  relationship  be- 
tween  size  and  yield  are  implicitly  theories  of  the 
effect  of  size  relative  to  the  size  of  other  current  new 
issues.  If  a data  sample  covers  an  extended  period  of 
time,  size  measured  in  nominal  terms  may  be  incom- 
patible  with  theories  of  how  size  is  supposed  to  affect 
yield.  This  problem  is  aggravated  by  the  fact  that, 
due  to  inflation  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  issue  size 
has  an  upward  trend  in  the  period  covered  by  virtu- 
ally  all  the  regression  studies.  The  longer  the  data 
period  covered  by  a  regression,  the  greater  is  the 
risk  that  the  coefficient  of  size  is  picking  up  some 
spurious  correlation  between  the  trend  in  size  and  in 
the  dependent  variable.  An  example  of  this  is 
Kessel’s  study  which  used  data  covering  a  nine-year 
period.  Over  this  period  there  was  a  significant 
downward  trend  in  the  spread  between  lower  rated 
and  Aaa-rated  bonds.  Kessel’s  regression  shows  a 
negative  and  highly  significant  coefficient  on  size  but 
this  may  simply  reflect  correlation  between  the  up- 
ward  trend  in  size  and  the  downward  trend  in  risk 
premiums  over  the  period.40 
Regression  Results  The  regression  results  for 
issue  size  show  a  division  depending  on  whether  the 
dependent  variable  was  (1)  reoffering  yield  or  (2) 
NIC  or  TIC.  Of  the  nine  studies  that  found  a  sig- 
nificant  relationship  between  size  and  NIC  or  TIC, 
all  but  one  found  a  simple  positive  relationship  [2, 
3,  4,  6,  7,  15,  19,  24].  The  one  exception  was  the 
ACIR  study  [1],  which  found  a  negative  relationship 
for  small  issues  and  a  positive  one  for  large  issues. 
Conversely,  of  the  four  that  found  a  significant  rela- 
tionship  between  size  and  reoffering  yield,  two  [17, 
21]  found  a  simple  negative  relationship  and  none 
found  a  simple  positive  relationship.41 
Unfortunately,  the  two  studies  that  found  a  signifi- 
cant  negative  relationship  between  issue  size  and 
reoffering  yields  used  data  series  covering  nine  years 
and  measured  size  in  current  dollars.  Thus,  they  are 
subject  to  the  criticisms  discussed  above.  Benson, 
Kidwell,  Koch,  and  Rogowski  [5]  corrected  for  the 
trend  in  size  by  measuring  it  in  price-deflated  (i.e., 
40 Tanner  [25]  pointed  out  this  problem  with  Kessel’s 
study. 
41 This  would  seem  to  imply  that  the  net  effect  of  issue 
size  on  underwriter  spread  is  positive.  However,  the 
behavioral  interpretation  of  the  result  is  not  clear  because 
issue  size  is  thought  to  affect  underwriter  spread  both 
directly  and  indirectly  through  its  effect  on  the  number 
of  bids  (see  footnote  39). 
“real”)  dollars.  They  tested  a quadratic  specification 
for  issue  size  and  concluded  that  increased  size  re- 
duced  reoffering  yield  up  to  a  certain  point  ($26 
million  in  1972  dollars)  after  which  further  increases 
in  size  raised  reoffering  yields.  As  noted,  they 
attributed  this  pattern  to  a  combination  of  market- 
ability  and  supply  effects.  Broaddus  and  Cook  [8], 
who  used  data  covering  a  period  of  two  years,  tested 
various  forms  of  issue  size  and  found  that  the  quad- 
ratic  specification  worked  best. 
In  summary,  even  though  issue  size  has  been  used 
as  an  explanatory  variable  in  22  regression  studies  of 
tax-exempt  yields,  there  is  no  generally  accepted 
theory  of  how  issue  size  should  affect  reoffering 
yields.  A  common  and  perhaps  intuitively  plausible 
belief  is  that  issue  size  is  a  proxy  for  marketability 
and  that  consequently  it  should  have  a  negative  effect 
on  reoffering  yields.  However,  none  of  the  regres- 
sion  studies  have  provided  any  evidence  of  the  link 
between  issue  size  and  bid-ask  spreads.  Studies 
using  reoffering  yield  as  the  dependent  variable 
found  a  negative  relationship  between  size  and  yield 
but  these  studies  are  subject  to  the  criticism  that  they 
measure  size  in  nominal  dollars  over  an  extended 
period  of time.  One  study  dealt  with  this  problem  by 
measuring  size  in  constant  dollars  and  found  in- 
creases  in  issue  size  exert  a  downward  impact  on 
yields  up  to  a  point  and  an  upward  effect  thereafter. 
Revenue  versus  General  Obligation  Bonds 
Almost  all  of  the  studies  using  data  for  both  gen- 
eral  obligation  and  revenue  bonds  have  included  a 
revenue  bond  dummy  variable  to  capture  any  sys- 
tematic  difference  between  the  yields  on  general  obli- 
gation  and  revenue  bonds  not  captured  by  the  other 
explanatory  variables.  In  all  cases,  the  coefficient  of 
the  revenue  bond  dummy  variable  has  been  positive 
and  significant. 
Explanations  for  the  Positive  Relationship  Between 
Revenue  Dummy  Variable  and  Yields  Virtually  all 
the  studies  that  have  included  a  revenue  bond  dummy 
variable  fail  to  specify  the  predicted  effect  of  this 
variable  on  tax-exempt  yields.  Consequently,  the 
explanations  are  basically  ad  hoc  attempts  to  explain 
a  statistically  significant  result.  Three  explanations 
have  been  offered  for  the  positive  coefficient  of  the 
revenue  bond  dummy  variable.  Hopewell  and  Kauf- 
man  [16]  argued  that  the  positive  effect  of  revenue 
status  on  yields  reflects  a  perception  on  the  part  of 
investors  that  revenue  bonds  carry  a  higher  default 
risk  than  general  obligation  bonds  of  equal  rating. 
Broaddus  and  Cook  argued  that  an  equally  plausible 
34  ECONOMIC  REVIEW, MAY/JUNE  1982 explanation  is  that  the  revenue  bond  coefficient  re- 
flects  the  relatively  poorer  marketability  of  revenue 
bonds.  Revenue  bonds  generally  have  poorer  sec- 
ondary  markets  and  higher  bid-ask  spreads  than 
comparable  (in  size  and  rating)  general  obligation 
bonds.42  Investors  would  therefore  be  expected  to 
demand  a  somewhat  higher  yield  on  revenue  bonds  in 
compensation  for  the  greater  loss  experienced  if those 
bonds  are  sold  prior  to  maturity.  Since  none  of  the 
tax-exempt  yield  regressions  include  a  variable  that 
directly  captures  the  effect  of  marketability  on  yield, 
the  revenue  bond  dummy  variable  may  capture  some 
of this  effect.  Finally,  Silber  [48]  has  suggested  that 
the  revenue  bond  dummy  variable  picks up  the  effect 
on  yields  of  bank  ineligibility  to  underwrite  most 
revenue  bonds. 
Regression  Results  Ten  of  the  regression  studies 
included  a  revenue  bond  dummy  variable  and  all  of 
these  reported  a  positive  and  statistically  significant 
coefficient.  Six  used  NIC  or  TIC  as  the  dependent 
variable  and  four  used  reoffering  yields  (see  refer- 
ences).  There  is  no  systematic  difference  in  the 
magnitude  of  the  coefficient  between  the  two  sets  of 
studies. 
Kessel  [17]  estimated  that  revenue  status  raised 
reoffer  yields,  approximately  8.5  basis  points.  Al- 
though  Kessel  offered  no  explicit  rationale  for  the 
inclusion  of  the  revenue  bond  dummy  variable  in  his 
specification,  Silber  argued  that  the  coefficient  cap- 
tures  a  direct  effect  of  bank  ineligibility  on  reoffer 
yields.  This  interpretation  is  possible  since  Kessel 
used  pre-1968  data,  when  virtually  all  revenue  bonds 
were  ineligible. 
The  coefficients  of  the  revenue  bond  dummy  vari- 
able  in  the  Broaddus-Cook  regressions,  all  of  which 
are  significant,  indicate  that  revenue  status  increases 
yields  from  about  6  basis  points  at  the  5-year  ma- 
turity  to  about  10  basis  points  at  the  longer  maturi- 
ties.  These  results  are  quite  close  to  Kessel’s  estimate. 
The  coefficients  of  the  revenue  bond  dummy  variable 
in  the  other  studies  were  generally  higher,  in  some 
cases  over  20  basis  points  [15,  19,  20,  21]. 
In  summary,  it  seems  clear  that  the  yields  on  reve- 
nue  issues  are  systematically  higher  than  comparably 
rated  general  obligation  bonds.  However,  it  is  not 
clear  whether  this  reflects  (1)  default  risk  not  cap- 
42 This statement  was  confirmed  by  discussions  with 
underwriters.  Also,  some  indirect  evidence  on  this  point 
comes  from  a  1973  Municipal  Finance  Officers  Associ- 
ation  Survey  [39],  which  reported  that  a  new  revenue 
issue  has  an  average  marketing  cost  per  $1,000  about 
twice  as  large  as  that  of  a  new  general  obligation  issue 
($3.84  versus  $1.98). 
tured  by  the  rating  category  dummy  variables,  (2) 
poorer  marketability  of  revenue  bonds,  or  (3)  bank 
ineligibility  to  underwrite  most  revenue  bonds.  Ulti- 
mately,  the  only  way  to  answer  this  question  is  to 
include  as  explanatory  variables  more  explicit  mea- 
sures  of  default  risk,  marketability,  and  bank  eligi- 
bility.43 
Segmentation  by  Class  of  Bond 
Benson,  Kidwell,  Koch,  and  Rogowski  [5]  argued 
that  because  of  regulation  and  liquidity  needs,  banks 
purchase  primarily  high-quality  tax-exempt  bonds 
and  that,  consequently,  changes  in  commercial  bank 
demand  for  tax-exempt  bonds  should  influence  the 
relationship  between  the  yields  on  high-  and  low- 
rated  bonds.  To  test  this  theory  they  ran  the  stan- 
dard  tax-exempt  yield  regression  model  with  the  ratio 
of  bank  net  purchases  of  tax-exempt  securities  to 
total  net  issues  as  an  additional  explanatory  variable. 
The  regression  supported  their  hypothesis  that  in- 
creases  in  commercial  bank  demand  for  tax-exempts 
increase  the  differential  between  the  yield  on  low- 
rated  bonds  and  the,  yield  on  high-rated  bonds. 
Using  the  same  type  of  reasoning,  Kidwell  and 
Koch  [19]  argued  that  the  markets  for  general  obli- 
gation  and  revenue  bonds  might  be  segmented.  To 
test  their  hypothesis  they  included,  in  addition  to  the 
revenue  bond  dummy  variable,  a  number  of  terms 
constructed  by  multiplying  the  revenue  bond  dummy 
variable  by  other  variables.  They  concluded  that  the 
differential  between  the  yields  on  revenue  bonds  and 
those  on  high-grade  general  obligation  bonds  in- 
creases  as  commercial  banks  increase  their  purchases 
of  net  tax-exempt  securities  and  as  the  supply  of 
revenue  bonds  increases  relative  to  the  total  supply 
of  new  tax-exempt  bonds.  They  also  concluded  that 
the  spread  between  revenue  and  general  obligation 
yields  varies  inversely  with  the  GNP  growth  rate. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
This  article  has  surveyed  the  evidence  from  25 
regression  studies  on  the  determinants  of  individual 
tax-exempt  bond  yields.  There  is  general  agreement 
among  the  studies  as  to  why  coupon,  call  provision, 
and  default  risk  variables  should  affect  tax-exempt 
bond  yields.  The  variables  used  in  the  regressions 
fit  the  underlying  rationales  fairly  well,  although  the 
complexity  of  call  price  schedules  has  made  it  diffi- 
cult,  if  not  impossible,  to  devise  an  accurate  proxy 
43 In  the  case  of  bank  eligibility  that  has  in  some  cases 
been  done.  See  Section  III. 
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for  these  variables  are  fairly  good.  Many  studies, 
however,  have  had  difficulty  estimating  the  effect  of 
call  risk  for  the  reasons  discussed  earlier. 
The  relatively  few  studies  that  have  included  re- 
gional  market  conditions  variables  have  found  them 
to  have  the  predicted  effect  on  tax-exempt  yields. 
The  basic  idea  underlying  the  inclusion  of  these  vari- 
ables  is  that  because  investors  inside  and  outside  a 
region  face  different  taxes,  costs,  and  regulations, 
yields  within  a  region  can  move  over  a  limited  range 
in  response  to  regional  market  conditions  without 
inducing  interregional  arbitrage.  This  theory,  while 
plausible,  has  not  been  given  a  rigorous  theoretical 
formulation.  Hence,  the  specific  choice  of  variables 
used  to  test  it  has  been  somewhat  arbitrary.  The 
same  limitation  applies  to  testing  for  the  effects  of 
segmentation  by  class  of  bond.  Also,  the  rationale 
for  this  type  of  segmentation  seems  to  be  weaker 
because  it  does  not  rely  on  differential  taxes  and 
information  costs. 
The  regression  results  for  the  underwriter  compe- 
tition  variables,  especially  the  number  of  bids,  are 
remarkably  consistent  across  studies.  There  is  strong 
disagreement,  however,  on  the  ability  of search  theory 
to  explain  the  correlation  between  these  variables  and 
tax-exempt  yields.  In  particular,  a  number  of  recent 
studies  (especially  [40,  ,41])  have  argued  that  the 
underwriter  competition  variables  are  picking  up 
differences  in  intrinsic  quality  and  marketability  not 
captured  by  other  variables  in  the  regression,  The 
basic  problem  is  that  the  search  theory  explanation 
in  its  present  state  does  not  clearly  link  the  under- 
writer  competition  variables  to  aggregate  underwriter 
search. 
The  problem  with  the  issue  size  and  revenue  bond 
dummy  variables  is  that  they  are  not  clearly  related 
to  the  theories  that  have  been  used  to  justify  their 
inclusion  in  tax-exempt  yield  regressions.  As  noted, 
the  appropriate  solution  to  this  problem  would  be  to 
include  variables  that  are  directly  related  to  the 
underlying  theory.  Most  important  from  this  stand- 
point  would  be  a  variable  that  accurately  reflects 
marketability.  The  logical  choice  is  the  bid-ask 
spread  in  the  secondary  market.44  In  the  absence  of 
an  accurate  measure  of  marketability,  the  interpre- 
tation  of  the  coefficients  of  issue  size  and  the  revenue 
bond  dummy  variable  (and,  for  that  matter,  the 
underwriter  competition  variables)  will  remain 
clouded. 
In  conclusion,  the  regression  studies  surveyed  in 
this  article  provide  much  information  on  the  deter- 
minants  of  individual  tax-exempt  bond  yields.  In  a 
couple  of  instances  further  evidence  might  be  ob- 
tained  through  the  inclusion  or  more  careful  specifi- 
cation  of  a  variable.  More  generally,  however,  it 
seems  unlikely  that  additional  regression  analysis  will 
shed  new  light  on  the  determinants  of  tax-exempt 
bond  yields.  Rather,  the  need  is  for  a  more  rigorous 
and  clearer  articulation  of  the  theories  underlying  the 
variables  employed.  Most  important  in  this  regard 
is  a theory  convincingly  linking  the  underwriter  com- 
petition  variables,  especially  the  number  of  bids,  to 
aggregate  search.  Also,  in  the  case  of  market  seg- 
mentation  by  region  (or  by  class  of  bond)  it  would 
be  desirable  to  have  a  more  rigorous  theory  of  how 
heterogeneous  investors  confronted  with  different 
taxes,  costs,  and  regulations  can  lead  to  a  situation  in 
which  regional  market  conditions  affect  the  relative 
yields  on  tax-exempt  bonds. 
44 There  is  no  bid-ask  spread  for  new  issues  but  a  reason- 
able  proxy  would  be  the  bid-ask  spread  on  other  out- 
standing  bonds  of  the  issuer  or  the  bid-ask  spread  of  the 
new  issue  after  it  begins  to  trade  in  the  secondary  market. 
The  difficulty  here  is  that  there  is  no  comprehensive 
published  data  on  bid-ask  spreads  in  the  tax-exempt 
market,  so  this  data  would  have  to  be  gathered  through 
the  dealer  community. 
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